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COMFORTABLY NUMB: MEDICALIZING (AND
MITIGATING) PAIN-AND-SUFFERING DAMAGES
Lars Noah*
It has been said, "time heals all wounds. "I do not agree. The wounds
remain. In time, the mind, protecting its sanity, covers them with scar
tissue and the pain lessens. But it is never gone.
-Rose F. Kennedy (1974)
1. INTRODUCTION
Among the compensatory damages that a plaintiff may recover
in tort litigation, awards for pain and suffering have attracted the
most attention. Attorneys, judges, legislators, and scholars from
various disciplines long have struggled to measure and make sense
of this aspect of compensation for tortiously caused injuries. With
the steady expansion of what falls within the rubric of nonpecuni-
ary damages and in the types of claims eligible for such awards, to
say nothing of the growth in the absolute and relative size of this
portion of compensatory awards, pain-and-suffering damages have
become increasingly controversial.
Although it canvasses the competing arguments about this sub-
ject and accompanying proposals for reform, this Article ultimately
sidesteps much of the debate in order to offer a fairly modest set of
suggestions for better understanding and perhaps more sensibly
cabining monetary damages for pain and suffering. A perspective
rooted in medical practice might help to clarify the purposes and,
in turn, the proper magnitude of such awards. Once we come to
understand emotional distress as just another type of injury par-
tially responsive to therapeutic interventions, the avoidable
consequences rule, which obligates victims to take reasonable steps
to mitigate their harm, should provide clearer parameters for fix-
ing pain-and-suffering damages.
* Professor of Law, Univ. of Florida. An earlier version of this Article was presented
to the faculty at Vanderbilt, and I would like to thank those in attendance for their feedback.
My title alludes to a well-known song of that name from Pink Floyd's album The Wall
(Columbia Records 1979). Cf Alex B. Long, [Insert Song Lyrics Here]: The Uses and Misuses of
Popular Music L)rics in Legal Writing, 64 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 531, 540, 570 (2007) (noting
the relative dearth of references to Pink Floyd).
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II. PAIN AND SUFFERING (AND SUCH)
This Article asks a fairly fundamental but rarely explored ques-
tion: why do courts invariably treat awards for pain and suffering as
"noneconomic" damages, distinguishing them from awards for
medical expenses and other types of economic damages? Before,
however, trying to formulate an answer in Part III, this Article
summarizes the debate over pain-and-suffering damages and in-
troduces a handful of the more interesting proposals for reform.
A. Distinguishing Economic and Noneconomic Damages
Noneconomic damages encompass a variety of overlapping (and
imprecise) categories such as pain, mental anguish, anxiety, emo-
tional distress, and nervous shock.' Loss of enjoyment of life (a.k.a.
"hedonic" damages), which might be understood as the depriva-
tion of the normal pleasures of living (the opposite of pain), also
represents a compensable type of nonpecuniary harm. Finally,
various derivative claims, such as loss of consortium, companion-
ship, and society (essentially for the deprivation of the positive
emotional support previously received from the injured victim),
fall within the domain of noneconomic damages.3
By compensating plaintiffs for their medical expenses and lost
earnings, courts treat the physical and economic aspects of bodily
injury as pecuniary damages, but the emotional aspects of such in-
1. See, e.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (explain-
ing that "pain and suffering" is a "unitary concept" that "has served as a convenient label
under which a plaintiff may recover not only for physical pain but for fright, nervousness,
grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehen-
sion, terror or ordeal"); Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 862 n.12 (Conn. 1996) (using
these various descriptors interchangeably); Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700
N.W.2d 333, 347 (Iowa 2005); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1050 (2000) ("The
pain for which recovery is allowed includes virtually any form of conscious suffering, both
emotional and physical." (footnotes omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 715-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(distinguishing between pain and suffering, permanent impairment/disfigurement, and loss
of enjoyment, and referring to the prescription of antidepressants for the treatment of post-
traumatic stress disorder as some evidence supporting the jury's noneconomic damage
award of $1.75 million after a serious eye injury); see also Kyle R. Crowe, Note, The Semantical
Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss: Should Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and
Suffering Damage, 75 IowA L. REv. 1275, 1277 (1990) (explaining that many jurisdictions
treat loss of enjoyment of life as a subset of pain and suffering rather than as a freestanding
category of noneconomic damages). For more on the debate over hedonic damages, see
infra note 190.
3. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136,146-47 (1992) ("As emo-
tional harms attained legitimacy during the past decade, tort law increasingly acknowledged
another manifestation of psychic injury-the harm to relational interests.").
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juries remain within the category of nonpecuniary damages.
Courts routinely draw a distinction between "special" and "general"
damages, the former denoting economic harms (e.g., past medical
expenses) and requiring specific proof.4 General damages, in con-
trast, have an entirely open-ended quality to them,5 and courts may
even constrain the sometimes creative efforts of plaintiffs' lawyers
to "prove" the nature of such harms.6
In its Restatement of the Law of Torts, the American Law Institute
(ALI) has struggled to make sense of these characterizations. The
Second Restatement offered the following explanation:
The sensations caused by harm to the body or by pain or hu-
miliation are not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss,
and a sum of money is not the equivalent of peace of mind.
Nevertheless, damages given for pain and humiliation are
called compensatory. They give to the injured person some
pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is likely to suffer.
There is no scale by which the detriment caused by suffering
can be measured and hence there can be only a very rough
4. See, e.g., Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 150, 156-57 (Iowa 2004); Veazey
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 587 So. 2d 5, 8-9 (La. Ct. App. 1991);Jackson v. Brumfield,
458 So. 2d 736, 737 (Miss. 1984) (bills for prescription drugs); Anderson v. A.PI. Co. of
Minn., 559 N.W.2d 204, 210 (N.D. 1997); Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 702-06 (lost earning capac-
ity); see also DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1992) ("The important
distinction between 'economic' and 'non-economic' damages is carefully defined by the
statute."); Thibeaux v. Trotter, 883 So. 2d 1128, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 2004) ("General damages
[as contrasted with special damages] are speculative in nature and, thus, incapable of being
fixed with any mathematical certainty."); Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W.
Va. 1982) (distinguishing between "liquidated" and "unliquidated" damages). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 cmts. b & c (1979).
5. See Duncan v. Kansas City Ry., 773 So. 2d 670, 682 (La. 2000); Botta v. Brunner, 138
A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1958) ("For hundreds of years, the measure of damages for pain and
suffering following in the wake of personal injury has been 'fair and reasonable compensa-
tion.' This general standard was adopted because of universal acknowledgement that a more
specific or definitive one is impossible."); id. at 718-19 ("The varieties and degrees of pain
are almost infinite. Individuals differ greatly in susceptibility to pain and in capacity to with-
stand it."); id. at 720 ("[Plain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathematical or
financial."); see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing jury instructions).
6. SeeJoseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem Arguments for
Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. Rv. 1, 10-11, 13-18 (2003);Jessica M.
Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493,
526-31, 561-69 (2004) (discussing the admissibility of "day in the life" videos); see also infra
note 56 (discussing the judicial treatment of expert testimony concerning hedonic dam-
ages); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-69(1) (2007) (prohibiting expert testimony about the
monetary value of pain and suffering damages). See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation,
Necessity of Expert Testimony on Issue of Permanence of Injury and Future Pain and Suffering, 20
A.L.R.5th 1 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
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correspondence between the amount awarded as damages
and the extent of the suffering.7
In the course of revising the Second Restatement, the ALI split the
subject into different parts, including one volume designed to ad-
dress "liability for physical harm."" Initially, the reporters planned
to carve out emotional harms for separate treatment, even while
conceding that the expansion of claims for mental distress had
muddied the line.' In the end, the ALI decided to include emo-
tional harms within the ambit of this volume.'0
As one commentator noted, "the line between pecuniary and
nonpecuniary harms is fuzzy."" In contexts where plaintiffs may
recover only economic damages (as in the case of many wrongful
death statutes), the question of characterization becomes tremen-
dously important. 2 It also has federal tax implications because
Congress excluded from "gross income" only those compensatory
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a; see also id. § 905 & cmt. i.
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005); see also Martha Chanallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort
Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 751, 752-60 (2001) (criticizing this decision to marginalize non-
physical injuries). Previous volumes of the Third Restatement had addressed matters of appor-
tionment and products liability.
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (Proposed Final Draft No. 1) § 4 cmt. d; see
also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817-21 (Cal. 1980).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM ch. 8 (Tentative Final Draft No. 5, 2007).
11. Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 69 n.23
(1993) ("For example, loss of a wife's consortium was historically thought of as an economic
harm to her husband, because the law focused on the services she owed him; but in a mod-
ern understanding, the emotional component of the loss is more important."); see also id.
(adding that psychotherapy can help both "to make the victim functional again as a worker"
and to promote "emotional satisfaction," but deciding to "ignore the difficulty of drawing
the line between pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms, as well as what we can learn from this
difficulty"); Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Cri-
tique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REv. 91, 125-36 (1993); id. at 95
(challenging "the ability to categorize the vast and complex spectrum of losses into a di-
chotomy between pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses"); Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown,
Tort Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease and
Prescribing a Remedy, 22 MISS. C. L. REv. 9, 28 (2002) (cautioning that "these lines of demar-
cation are often indistinct").
12. For example, wrongful death statutes historically allowed recoveries for only pecu-
niary losses. See Liff v. Schildkrout, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (N.Y. 1980); John Fabian Witt,
From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort
Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 717, 735, 741-43
(2000); see also infra note 192 (discussing workers' compensation). Nonetheless (and putting
aside subsequent legislative reforms), some courts stretched the characterization to allow
recovery for the loss of companionship in such cases. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gau-
det, 414 U.S. 573, 586-88 (1974); Reiser v. Coburn, 587 N.W.2d 336, 339-42 (Neb. 1998);
Green v. Bittner, 424 k2d 210, 215-16 (NJ. 1980); see also AndrewJ. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A
Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1, 22-27 (2005).
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damages awarded "on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness."0
3
More generally, the division between economic and noneconomic
damages replicates the largely discredited Cartesian dichotomy be-
tween body and mind.14 It also parallels an increasingly criticized
distinction in medicine between curative and palliative care. 15 Physi-
cians must do more than fix broken bodies-they should strive to
alleviate their patients' pain and suffering even if unable to root
out the underlying cause of such symptoms. 16 Indeed, some health
care professionals have come to regard chronic pain as a disease
process in its own right. 7 This nosological debate aside, recognizing
13. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (2000) (emphasis added); see also id. § 104(a) ("[Elmotional
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence
shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care
... attributable to emotional distress."); Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 174-76 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Lindsey v. Comm'r, 422 F.3d 684, 687-89 (8th Cir. 2005); F. Patrick Hubbard, Making
People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress,
49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 744-45 (1997).
14. See Levit, supra note 3, at 191 ("Despite the cumulative and trenchant evidence in
psychology, sociology, biology, medicine, and psychopharmacology dispelling ancient con-
cepts of mind-body dualism, the mental-material distinction persists in tort law."); see also
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS XXX
(4th ed., text rev. 2000) ("[T]he term mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction
between 'mental' disorders and 'physical' disorders that is a reductionist anachronism of
mind/body dualism."); cf Youndy C. Cook, Comment, Messing with Our Minds: The Mental
Illness Limitation in Health Insurance, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 345, 348-64 (1996) (explaining
that, when interpreting insurance policies that provide less generous coverage in cases of
mental illnesses, courts have focused on either the nature of the symptoms, the course of
treatment, or the underlying cause).
15. See Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 639, 640 (1982) ("The split between mind and body that has so deeply influenced our
approach to medical care was proposed by Descartes to resolve certain philosophical is-
sues.... An anachronistic division of the human condition into what is medical (having to
do with the body) and what is nonmedical (the remainder) has given medicine too narrow a
notion of its calling."); Ben A. Rich, A Prescriptionfor the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for
Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 24 (2000) ("Since pain and suffering, under-
stood as sensation and emotion, are quintessentially subjective human experiences, they lie
outside of the acceptable parameters of the curative model."); id. at 18 ("Modem medicine
has been shaped by the Cartesian dualism of mind and body... [, so] the responsibility for
dealing with pain and suffering [experienced by the mind] has necessarily been removed
from the physician's job description [of treating the body]."); id. at 18 n.l15 (noting that
"the transition from a biomedical to a biocultural model of pain, which take [s] into account
the nonphysiological aspects of the pain experience, blurs earlier distinctions between pain
[directly traceable to tissue injury] and suffering").
16. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL &JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, Opinion 2.20, at 76 (2006) ("Physicians
have an obligation to relieve pain and suffering .... "); Cassell, supra note 15, at 639 ("The
obligation of physicians to relieve human suffering stretches back into antiquity."); Edmund
D. Pellegrino, Emerging Ethical Issues in Palliative Care, 279 JAMA 1521, 1521 (1998) ("Not to
relieve pain optimally is tantamount to moral and legal malpractice.").
17. See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 285, 286-87, 318-
26 (2005); id. at 305 ("[T]he distinction between 'physical' and 'mental' aspects of illness
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pain and suffering as more than, in turn, a symptom of physical
injury and an associated emotional response may help to illumi-
nate the possible contingency of the well-entrenched doctrinal line
between pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.
Courts regard medical expenses as a species of pecuniary dam-
ages, though some commentators have questioned this
characterization insofar as the physical injury itself does not de-
prive the victim of an asset. 8 Even so, because the rule of avoidable
consequences obligates the tortfeasor to reimburse the victim's
reasonable mitigation efforts,' 9 and because physicians can correct
many physical injuries without any lasting disability (thus, making
the victim "whole"), it makes perfect sense to understand these
awards as economic damages. 20 Even absent the possibility of cor-
recting a physical injury, health insurance policies pay for
interventions designed solely to diminish pain and suffering, for
instance by covering analgesia2' and, to a lesser extent, mental
may be a heuristic device rather than an ontological divide."); Jean Marx, Prolonging the Ag-
any, 305 SCIENCE 326, 326 (2004); Mary Carmichael, The Changing Science of Pain, NEWSWEEK,
June 4, 2007, at 40, 42-43 (quoting Will Rowe, executive director of the American Pain
Foundation, as saying that "'there's a growing awareness that pain is a disease of its own,"'
and explaining that it represents "an overactivity of the nervous system"); id. at 40 ("Chronic
pain is one of the most pervasive and intractable medical conditions in the United States,
with one in five Americans afflicted."). At a minimum, health care providers should chart
pain as a vital sign (along with temperature, pulse, respiration, and blood pressure). See
Laurie Tarkan, New Efforts Against an Old Foe: Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at Fl; see also
William J. Donnelly, Taking Suffering Seriously: A New Role for the Medical Case History, 71 ACAD.
MED. 730 (1996).
18. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniay Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1914-15 (1995) ("[M]edical insurance,
which proponents of the conventional wisdom offer as the primary example of pecuniary-loss
insurance, should be, according to their own definition, classified as nonpecuniary-loss insur-
ance."); see also id. at 1858 n.239 ("[M]uch of modern medical care is designed to relieve pain
and suffering, but for reasons that are not clear to us, nobody claims that those aspects of medi-
cal care are for the nonpecuniary aspects of an injury."). The point seems even clearer when a
collateral source already has paid for the victim's medical expenses. See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno,
101 P.3d 1149, 1155-63 (Haw. 2004).
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See Pryor, supra note 11, at 129 & n.123 (explaining that, "if the replaceability test is
applied to the original loss as a whole, then even those losses addressed by basic medical
care are not pecuniary unless the medical care is completely restorative," but noting that
"[v]irtually every insurance theory analyst mentions basic medical expenses as an example of
a pecuniary loss"); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659,
669-76, 691-93 (2003) (arguing that, rather than viewing compensatory damages as an
effort to return victims to their pre-injury state, courts should focus on what benefits an
inevitably transformed individual can derive from rehabilitative efforts); id. at 664 ("In re-
cent years, the meaning of compensation itself has become more contested as a matter of
theory and doctrine."); id. at 665 (referring to the rising "fragmentation" and "contesta-
bility" of compensatory damage categories).
21. On occasion, however, insurers may scrimp on such coverage. See, e.g., BarnabyJ.
Feder, Aetna to End Payment for a Drug in Colonoscopies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, at C2 (dis-
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health services.2 Courts treat awards for such items as economic
rather than noneconomic damages.23 In short, compensation for
medical expenses helps to cover past and future expenditures ne-
cessitated by an injury, and these damages are no less "pecuniary"
when a court awards future medical expenses (in lieu of the lost
earning capacity associated with an alleged disability) to a victim
who does not intend to spend the award on mitigation efforts.
Separately, and within the category of pecuniary damages, the
line between medical expenses and lost wages has shifted over time
as previously untreatable and disabling traumas now respond to
advanced surgical and other interventions. Thus, awards that once
compensated victims for their lost earning capacity nowadays in-
stead may go to pay for health care treatments and rehabilitation.
Along similar lines, and in light of improvements in the treatment
of pain and suffering, this Article argues that courts should recast
as medical expenses at least some of the sums that they tradition-
ally have allowed as nonpecuniary damages.
B. Claims for Nothing Other Than Emotional Distress
Pain and suffering may occur even without physical injury, but
courts only gradually came to allow compensation when tortious
behavior caused purely emotional harm. The tort of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress emerged during the second half of
the twentieth century in part because psychiatry had improved its
understanding of the nature of such injuries.24 Previously, judges
cussing recent decisions by major health insurers to classify propofol, a powerful anesthetic
that has facilitated colon cancer screening, as "medically unnecessary" in most cases).
22. See Richard G. Frank et al., Will Parity in Coverage Result in Better Mental Health Care?,
345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1701 (2001); Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness
and the Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8 (2000); Brian
D. Shannon, Paving the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental Illness: New Law or
Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 63, 68-69, 102-03 (1997); Richard E. Gardner,
Ill, Comment, Mind over Matter?: The Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between Mental and
Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 677 (2000) ("[H]ealth plans normally in-
clude less coverage for mental health care than for medical and surgical services; however,
both states and the federal government have begun to require that these services be covered
in the same way."); Chris Jenkins, Law Equalizes Coverage for Mental, Physical Care: "Milestone"
Measure Could Expand Treatment Services, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at BI. Unless one inter-
prets the less generous coverage for mental health care as reflecting consumer preferences
against paying premiums for such services, the failure to ensure sufficient access might
strengthen the case for offering tort compensation for out-of-pocket costs not reimbursed by
a collateral source.
23. See infra note 116.
24. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817, 821 (Cal. 1980); Corgan v.
Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608-09 (Ill. 1991); Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional
Harm: Is CompromisePossible?, 67 WASH. L. REv. 1, 25 (1992) ("Numerous commentators and
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had declined to recognize emotional distress claims lacking any
physical trigger or manifestation, out of a suspicion that such
harms were too easily feigned. Growing acceptance of psychiatric
testimony that the plaintiff suffered from a diagnosable mental ill-
26ness provided some reassurance of legitimacy.
Even when plaintiffs have satisfied the various other prerequi-
sites for bringing these tort claims, some courts continue to
demand medical evidence to support allegations of severe emo-
tional distress. For instance, several courts have allowed recoveries
based on a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) .
Some critics argue, however, that a PTSD diagnosis inappropriately
certifies the genuineness of an emotional distress complaint.2 9 Fur-
courts have observed that developments in science enable experts to adequately distinguish
between trivial and non-trivial emotional distress without reliance on physical consequences
of harm."). Conversely, new views about the nature and persistence of pain had led some
commentators to question the long-standing willingness of courts to award damages for this
type of harm. See, e.g., Cornelius J. Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New
Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1355, 1395-96 (1974); id. at 1365 ("[P]ain is a social and
psychological as well as physiological phenomenon."); id. at 1369 ("The new medical evi-
dence provides an additional argument for limiting or excluding such awards, at least in
cases in which no physiological basis for pain exists."); cf id. at 1371-72 & n.81 (conceding
that awards for mental suffering are another matter).
25. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Wis. 1994);John J.
Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liabilityfor Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REv. 789, 807-08,
838-39 (2007); Levit, supra note 3, at 172.
26. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Co-
herence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583, 604-05, 616 n.187 (1982); see also infra
notes 146 & 167 (discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress claims).
27. See, e.g., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983); Camper v. Minor,
915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996); Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 431 (Wash. 1998);
Stump v. Ashland, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 41, 53 (W. Va. 1997).
28. See, e.g., Gough v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 996 E2d 763, 767 (5th Cir.
1993); Berthelot v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 623 So. 2d 14, 22 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Giamanco v.
Epe, Inc., 619 So. 2d 842, 845-46 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co., 605 N.E.2d
805, 811 (Mass. 1993); Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 54-55 (Mont. 2004); Nichols v. Busse,
503 N.W.2d 173, 180 (Neb. 1993); see also Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeep-
ing Stress: The Science and Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LIYLE ROCK
L. REV. 9, 16-28 (2001) (summarizing the medical literature); EdwardJ. Hickling et al., The
Psychological Impact of Litigation: Compensation Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumati-
zation, and Other Lessons from MVAs, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 617, 619 (2006) (estimating that
"twenty-five percent of the population of injured car crash victims will develop this disor-
der"); id. at 627 ("Due to its link to a causal factor and subsequent psychological distress,
PTSD has increasingly become a diagnosis with the potential for legal recourse and financial
compensation.").
29. See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HAST-
INGS L.J. 241, 270-71 & n.108 (1999); David F. Partlett, 7brt Liability and the American Way:
Reflections on Liability for Emotional Distress, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 171, 180-83 (1997) (book re-
view); see also Benedict Carey, Most Will Be Mentally Ill at Some Point, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2005, at A18 (reporting that some experts question the growth in these sorts of di-
agnoses). When a treating (as opposed to testifying) physician renders such a diagnosis, it
normally coincides with a recommendation for treatment. Cf Noah, supra, at 303-04, 307
(discussing the possibility of junk diagnoses provided solely for forensic purposes); id. at
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thermore, the failure to seek out treatment after securing such a
diagnosis would seem to cast doubt on the seriousness of the al-
leged harm, especially if the recommended intervention carried
no significant risk.0 In any event, by recognizing emotional distress
claims, judges countenance awards of solely nonpecuniary dam-
ages; plaintiffs would have to prove special (pecuniary) damages
only if they also alleged that their suffering resulted in lost wages
or required expenditures for medical care.
C. Controversy over Awards for Pain and Suffering (and Distress)
As the California Supreme Court noted more than two decades
ago, "[t] houghtful jurists and legal scholars have for some time
raised serious questions as to the wisdom of awarding damages for
pain and suffering in any negligence case."3' In part, fundamental
disagreements exist about the purposes served by nonpecuniary
damage awards:
An economic loss can be compensated in kind by an economic
gain; but recovery for noneconomic losses such as pain and suf-
fering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on the legal fiction
that money damages can compensate for a victim's injury....
248-49, 298-99 & n.225 (explaining that mental health professionals may work backward
from the apparently successful treatment of nonspecific symptoms when making a diagno-
sis).
30. See Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1996); Robin-
son v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 261, 294-95 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs
allegations of sleeplessness and depression where he never sought any treatment for these
complaints); cf Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 445 (1997) (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in judgment in part) (noting that the plaintiff "sought no professional
help to ease his distress, and presented no medical testimony concerning his mental
health"); Spina v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771-76 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (ordering remittitur to $300,000 for nonpecuniary damages awarded in a sexual
harassment case); id. at 775 ("[T]he Court cannot uphold a $3 million verdict for a plaintiff
who has never sought mental health treatment, whose own expert witness opined that she
does not require such treatment, and who still retains her position with her employer.").
Conversely, and without regard to efforts at attaching a diagnostic label to the victim's com-
plaints, "a prescription for medicine or a visit to a doctor can lend support to a claim for
emotional distress." Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1993). If, how-
ever, plaintiff underwent a treatment that carried little or no risk, then such conduct may be
less probative of the genuineness of the alleged emotional injury. See infra notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.
31. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S.
892 (1985); see also id. at 681 n.16 (quotingJustice Traynor's dissent in Seffert v. L.A. Transit
Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961)); Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862-63 (Cal.
1977) (declining to recognize derivative claims for persons other than spouses); Philip L.
Merkel, Pain and Suffering Damages at Mid-Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View of the Problem
and the Legal Academy's First Responses, 34 CAP. U. L. REv. 545, 566-79 (2006).
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We accept this fiction, knowing that although money will nei-
ther ease the pain nor restore the victim's abilities, this device
is as close as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong.
We have no hope of evaluating what has been lost, but a
monetary award may provide a measure of solace for the con-
dition created .... s
In addition to providing a form of consolation, nonpecuiary
damages may serve a symbolic purpose in expressing society's ac-
knowledgement of (and respect for) the victim's right to bodily
integrity and disapproval of the harm caused by the tortfeasor,34
they may promote loss avoidance goals by sending a fuller deter-
rent signal,3' and they may help to cover the plaintiffs attorneys
fees.36
32. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 376 (explaining that the calculation "involves
no mathematical formula" but represents a "murky process");Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and
Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163, 171-201
(2004); id. at 164 ("Pain and suffering damages and the policy goals of modern tort law are
conceptually and operationally incompatible."); W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages
in Search of a Sounder Rationale, 1 MICH. L. & POL'v REv. 141, 169 (1996) ("The appropriate
levels of pain and suffering awards vary substantially depending on whether our objective is
to make the victim whole, provide optimal insurance, provide optimal deterrence, or foster
some other objective.").
33. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensa-
tion, 75 TEx. L. REV. 1567, 1588-89 (1997) (explaining that a monetary award may allow the
victim to flourish in new ways); see also Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1387, 1393 (2003) ("The common practice of awarding lump sums for future
pain and suffering without discounting to present value confirms that these awards are not
seriously understood to conform to actual loss.").
34. SeeJody Lyne6 Madeira, Regarding Pained Sympathy and Sympathy Pains: Reason, Mo-
rality, and Empathy in the Civil Adjudication of Pain, 58 S.C. L. Rav. 415 (2006) (responding to
objections of subjectivity and irrationality-and defending the role of compassion-in
evaluating claims for pain-and-suffering damages in personal injury litigation); Steven D.
Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis" A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 765, 788-89 (1987); see also id. at 783-85 (arguing that the dispute resolution process
itself serves to remedy the victim's "sense of injustice"); John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions
of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 443-47, 462-65 (2006)
(explaining that the now-dominant "make whole" understanding of compensatory damages
as a remedy for a loss conflicts with an earlier conception that focused on offering some
redress (satisfaction) for interference with a legal right).
35. See Kwasny v. United States, 823 E2d 194, 197-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) (or-
dering 50% remittitur of a pain-and-suffering damage award to the estate of a frail patient
who died after negligence); Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1097, 1116 (2003).
36. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55
DEPAUL L. REv. 399, 401, 419 (2006); Viscusi, supra note 32, at 157-58; see also Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225, 1244-46




The controversy has intensified in recent years, 7 in part because,
whatever the theoretical justifications, the only guidance that juries
get often resembles the following:
No definite standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed
by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for pain and
suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the
amount of such reasonable compensation. [Furthermore, the
argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evi-
dence of reasonable compensation.] In making an award for
pain and suffering you should exercise your authority with
calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix must
be just and reasonable in the light of the evidence.
Although admirable for their candor, such unhelpful jury instruc-
tions have led critics to lodge both conceptual and practical
objections to the award of nonpecuniary damages: they lack any
economic meaning as reflected by the absence of a market for first
party insurance,39 standardless instructions inevitably mean incon-
sistency among jury awards,4 ° the awards may be out of proportion
37. See, e.g., Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable,
and Inegalitarian (but Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006).
38. CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 14.13 (2007). Jury instructions in other jurisdic-
tions follow this general pattern. SeeJohnson v. Scaccetti, 927 A.2d 1269, 1283 (N.J. 2007);
RONALD W. EADES,JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 6.22 (5th ed. 2008);
Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems
and Possibilities, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 712, 718 (2000); see also id. at 736 (calling such
instructions "breathtakingly unhelpful"); David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain
and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 265 (1989) ("The response of the legal
system to the doctrinal and factual complexity of pain and suffering has been to make the
awarding of this element of damages procedurally simple but analytically impenetrable. The
law provides no guidance, in terms of any benchmark, standard figure, or method of analy-
sis, to aid the jury in the process of determining an appropriate award."); cf Thomas C.
Galligan,Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 172 (1996) (applauding
such instructions for inviting attention to the particulars of the victim's injuries); Neil Vid-
mar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 254-55 (1993) (finding that mock jurors re-
ported a wide variety of ways that they arrived at nonpecuniary awards).
39. See, e.g., 2 Am. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 206 (1991) ("When
tort doctrine is pictured in this way--as a port of entry into an insurance program paid for
and provided by members of the community for themselves-the claim of pain and suffer-
ing to any, let alone full, compensation appears shaky."); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 391-92 (1989); George L. Priest, The Current In-
surance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547, 1553 (1987). For responses to
this conventional wisdom, see Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages Be Abolished
from Tort Law?: More Experimental Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 977 (2005); Croley &
Hanson, supra note 18, at 1914-17 (summarizing their conclusions).
40. See, e.g., Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort
Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 340-46 (2006); Sugarman, supra note 36, at 416-17 (finding
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to the seriousness of the injury (which would inefficiently overdeter
and spread excessive costs among other users) ,' their unpredictabil-
ity complicates efforts at settlement and sends confused deterrent
signals, 2 and they largely escape appellate scrutiny. These charac-
teristics have prompted some scholars to go so far as to raise
procedural due process objections."
It takes little effort to find reports of jury verdicts for pain and
suffering that would strike most observers as at least mildly per-
plexing.45 For instance, a recent medical malpractice case included
an award of $100 million for pain and suffering that the trial judge
"the median [pain-and-suffering] awards for quadriplegia, loss of an arm (all types), loss of a
leg (all types), and loss of a finger, were $3.5 million, $1.5 million, $1 million, and $137,000,
respectively," with "ratios of more than twenty to one for several of the injuries"). But see
Rosselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison ofJurors, Judges,
and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 812-17 (1999) (finding little variability in awards and
recommending only modest procedural reforms to reduce it further).
41. SeeJohn E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpe-
cuniary Losses, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 402 (1992); King, supra note 32, at 190; Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-77, 408-15
(1988); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards:
Turning Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REv. 47, 70 (2002); 7bo Much Suffering,
NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 8 (noting that "pain and suffering awards appear to have cost
consumers tens of billions of dollars per year").
42. SeeKing, supra note 32, at 166-67, 185-92, 196-97.
43. See David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight ofjury Damages Assessments: A Pro-
posal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and
Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. REv. 1109, 1120, 1128-29, 1132-33 (1995); Geistfeld, supra
note 40, at 344; Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of
Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REv. 1401, 1401-04, 1416-17 (2004); cf. RonaldJ. Allen & Alexia
Brunet, The Judicial Treatment of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages in the 19th Century, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 365, 397 (2007) (finding that, before the twentieth century, courts
"kept a tight control over jury damage awards, notwithstanding the proposition of significant
jury discretion").
44. See RonaldJ. Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compen-
satory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 1249, 1274-75 (2007); id. at 1276
("[T]he transfer of assets without a factual basis violates due process, and the articulation of
the factual basis must come from somewhere if the practice of awarding noneconomic com-
pensatory damages can be justified."); Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process
Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 257-68,
290-97 (2003); see also Lars Noah, CivilJury Nullification, 86 IowA L. REv. 1601, 1626, 1645-
48 (2001); infra note 177 (discussing the use of punitive damage ratios).
45. See DeCamp, supra note 44, at 265-67; Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 41, at 64-65
(providing several recent examples); see also Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at
the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard, 51 Ami. J. Comp. L.
751, 809 (2003) (finding "no jurisdiction outside of the United States where a plaintiff can
currently recover more than about $300,000 for non-pecuniary damages, even in the most
catastrophic cases"); Sugarman, supra note 36, at 418 ("[T]he amounts awarded for pain
and suffering in the American cases we examined are vastly greater than the predicted
awards in Europe."). See generally WHAT'S IT WORTH: A GUIDE TO CURRENT PERSONAL INJURY
AWARDS AND SETTrLEMENTS (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007) (annual compilation organ-
ized by type of harm).
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reduced to $1.8 million, while a different personal injury verdict
included over $50 million in nonpecuniary damages that survived
on appeal . In another case, a New York jury awarded almost $9
million for pain and suffering to an inebriated dishwasher who lost
his arm when he fell under a subway train. A Mississippi jury
awarded $10 million to each of ten patients who had used the drug
46. See Evans v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Brooklyn, 766 N.Y.S.2d 577, 577-78 (App. Div.
2003) (affirming this remittitur, which also included a substantially reduced award for past
and future medical expenses of almost $4 million, in a case involving permanent brain dam-
age); Graham Rayman, Woman Gets $114M in Malpractice Suit, NEWSDAY, Nov. 24, 2001, at
A15; see also Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 384, 387-88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
(affirming remittitur of noneconomic damages from $15 million to approximately $6 mil-
lion where a young child lost much of his bladder after medical malpractice and required
corrective surgeries, but declining to order further reduction even though there was little
evidence of any lasting pain, untreatable suffering, or inability to lead a fairly normal life);
id. at 388 (Plaintiff's expert "testified that if future psychological issues arose, the issues
could be managed in six to twelve counseling sessions."); cf. Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co.,
46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 154, 167-72 (Ct. App. 2006) (invalidating as excessive a verdict that
included $105 million in noneconomic damages to an SUV driver left paraplegic after a
rollover accident, even after the trial judge had remitted that portion to approximately $65
million, unless the plaintiff accepted a further remittitur to $18 million, which her attorney
originally had suggested to the jury as the appropriate amount), vacated on other grounds, 127
S. Ct. 2250 (2007) (to reconsider the punitive damage award); Philip Morris Inc. v. French,
897 So. 2d 480, 485-87, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming ajury verdict of $5.5 mil-
lion for pain and suffering that the trial judge remitted to $500,000 to a flight attendant who
developed chronic sinusitis from exposure to second-hand smoke).
47. See Ritter v. Stanton, 745 N.E.2d 828, 832-33, 850-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (eco-
nomic damages totaled almost $1.3 million for a victim who survived after getting crushed
by a truck and undergoing more than fifty surgeries); see also Velarde v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 820
N.E.2d 37, 54-57 (Il. App. Ct. 2004) (affirming $49 million awarded for pain and suffering
to three occupants of a vehicle who suffered serious head injuries after getting hit by a
train); Kresin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 736 N.E.2d 171, 174-75, 178 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (re-
jecting an excessiveness objection to a $16.5 million verdict, which included approximately
$400,000 for medical expenses, $1 million for caretaking expenses, $6 million for pain and
suffering, $7 million for disability, and $2 million for disfigurement, in a case where an em-
ployee's negligence in operating a vehicle severely injured a 73-year-old customer in the
store's parking lot, requiring multiple surgeries and resulting in serious disabilities).
48. See Calvin Sims, $9 Million Won for Loss of Arm in Drunken Fal N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1990, at B3 (reporting that the verdict included $8.6 million for future pain and suffering as
against $200,000 for past pain and suffering and $17,055 for medical expenses (plus more
than $530,000 in lost earnings), and explaining that the plaintiff alleged the token clerk had
failed to alert police that he posed a risk to himself). After the judge ordered a new trial and
the plaintiff prevailed again (though instead emphasizing inadequate lighting on the plat-
form and recovering less than $3 million total for his pain and suffering), the appellate
courts reversed for lack of evidence of either breach or proximate causation. See Merino v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 639 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788-89 (App. Div.), afr'd, 675 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y
1996). For an illustrative case that survived on appeal, see Leon v. J&M Peppe Realty Corp.,
596 N.YS.2d 380, 389 (App. Div. 1993) (affirming a jury verdict in favor of a carpenter in-
jured by a circular saw (resulting in partial amputation of three fingers and causing him to
seek psychiatric care for PTSD), which included $14,000 for medical expenses, $100,000 for
past pain and suffering, and $1.5 million for future pain and suffering (running for 40
years), though the judge cut the latter award in half); id. at 387 (holding that the jury
should have allocated at least 15% of responsibility to the plaintiff for comparative negli-
gence).
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Propulsd,5 but the state supreme court reversed the judgment on
grounds of improper joinder after emphasizing that the jury's ver-
dict had ignored the very different circumstances of the plaintiffs,
including the fact that their claimed medical expenses ranged
from zero to $100,000. °
D. Some Proposed Reforms
Notwithstanding the wide range of views about the desirability of
awarding noneconomic damages, most observers seem to accept
the need for some type of reform.5' Only a few of the most strident
critics would abolish these awards altogether, and only a few of the
most ardent defenders find absolutely no room for improvement.
One recommendation for reducing variability among noneconomic
damage awards would create a binding schedule of values (derived
from past jury verdicts, subject to various adjustments) dependent
on the severity of the physical injury and the age of the victim.52
49. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 41, at 67-68; Melody Petersen, Jury Levies $100
Million Award Against Heartburn DrugMaker, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, § 1, at 32.
50. SeeJanssen Pharm., Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31, 48 (Miss. 2004) (noting that, al-
though the trial judge had remitted nine of the awards (to range from $2.5 million to $7.5
million), the ratio between medical expenses and the total award for each plaintiff still var-
ied dramatically). In the settlement of other class action claims, parties have hired experts to
allocate nonpecuniary awards to different victims according to various criteria. See Stephanie
Simon, Putting a Price on Pain, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 28, 2005, at Al.
51. See, e.g.,Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2001); Ran-
dall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering, "83 Nw. U.
L. REv. 908, 936 (1989) ("The problem with non-economic damages is, in sum, not that they
are inappropriate or unreal, but rather that they are extremely difficult to consistently
monetize in the absence of quantitative standards."); id. ("Although non-economic damages
are real and should be compensable in a fault-based system, this conclusion does not sup-
port totally unstructured decisionmaking about the appropriate levels of awards."); id. at
924-27 (elaborating on the problems caused by variability in awards); Mark Geistfeld, Plac-
ing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 840-43 (1995).
52. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 51, at 939-49, 975; id. at 945-46 ("Severity and age as
classifying measures are intuitively and empirically related to the subjective assessments of
the extent of pain and suffering likely to have been experienced, yet they are sufficiently
objective to facilitate their application in particular cases and to avoid 'gaming' by the par-
ties."); id. at 947 ("[S]ubjective and case-specific matters cannot be accommodated within a
point-value matrix, which accepts some degree of 'leveling' of potentially legitimate varia-
tion in order to achieve simplicity, ease of administration, and consistency of results."); id. at
938 ("Scheduling can provide rational standards-heretofore unavailable-for valuation,
thus improving the tort system's current approach, rather than abolishing or arbitrarily
limiting nonpecuniary damages."). Under this proposal, distress without underlying physical
injury got lumped together in a single category and assigned the lowest rank on the severity
scale. Id. at 920 n.76; see also id. at 942 n.158 (suggesting a further refinement "by distin-
guishing between short- and long-term 'emotional only' injuries"); id. at 963-64 n.237
(noting schedules do not address derivative claims such as loss of consortium).
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Although this idea has received a great deal of attention from
other scholars,53 it has had little evident impact on decisionmak-
54ers.
Other commentators have looked to the economics literature on
"willingness to pay" (WTP) for guidance about the appropriate
valuation of nonpecuniary damages in tort litigation. An expert
could derive these numbers from surveys asking people the maxi-
mum amount that they would spend to avoid a small risk of a fatal
injury ("contingent valuation" methodology) or from wage premi-
ums demanded for riskier lines of work or the extent of consumer
demand for safety features that increase the price of goods and
services ("revealed preferences" methodology).5 After calculating
the value of a statistical life (VSL), an expert might opine about
noneconomic damages in a case based on the degree to which an
injury has deprived the victim of life's pleasures.56 Alternatively,
53. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 87, 87 & n.1
(2006); Wissler et al., supra note 40, at 817; see also Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine
Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 777-90 (1995) (recommending instead
use of a nonbinding approach); EdwardJ. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspec-
tives on Pain and Suffering, 81 VA. L. REv. 1341, 1398-402 (1995) (suggesting that the
variance in observed awards may have more to do with the nature of the tort than the sever-
ity of the physical injury); id. at 1402 ("Our studies show that pain and suffering is an
inherently under-specified concept, and we believe that society may want consciously to
specify it differently in different contexts."); Frederick S. Levin, Note, Pain and Suffering
Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement "Anomie, " 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303 (1989)
(recommending a system modeled on criminal sentencing guidelines for use by juries in
setting awards for noneconomic damages).
54. SeeJoseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals Designed to Control Variability in General Damages
(Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 507-15
(2006). In contrast, several other countries have used such approaches. See Sugarman, supra
note 36, at 423-27 (discussing legislation in New South Wales (Australia),judicial precedent
in Canada, and the practice in Italy, France, England, and Germany); see also id. at 430-34
(recommending a similar approach in the United States coupled with fee shifting, but rec-
ognizing that politically it would stand little chance of success).
55. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
RISK 34-74 (1992); Ted R. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Surive?, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 876, 879, 891-907 (1989); see also Cooter, supra note 35, at 1112-15, 1120; id.
at 1102 ("[M]any incompensable losses correspond to compensable risks. For example, a
person will only spend so much to reduce the small risk that his child will die in an
automobile accident, but no amount of money will compensate for the child's death."); id.
at 1099 ("[A]ssume that a reasonable person would spend $100 to reduce the probability of
accidental death by 1/10,000.... [C]ourts should award damages of $1 million for wrongful
death."). But seeAdi Ayal, Can We Compensateforlncompensable Harms?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1123, 1128-29 (2003) ("[W]e cannot use data on people's actual expenditures in order to
achieve a true assessment of their subjective valuation of the harm they would suffer if the
risk materialized. Monetary investments in risk reduction are subject to numerous
[cognitive] effects, biasing different individuals' choices in similar directions.").
56. See Dennis C. Taylor, Note, Your Money or Your Life?: Thinking About the Use of Will-
ingness-to-Pay Studies to Calculate Hedonic Damages, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1519, 1526-31
(1994). Courts have, however, generally rejected the admission of such expert testimony. See,
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jurors might try to decide how much an individual would pay in or-
der to avoid a non-fatal risk of the sort encountered by a plaintiff
(focusing perhaps only on the risk of experiencing pain and suffer-
ing) in the course of extrapolating noneconomic damages.57
In health care economics (and regulatory arenas involving public
health), quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) have become a popular
measure of outcomes.5' Researchers calculate QALYs by first assign-
ing some number between zero (worst) and one (best) to reflect a
patient's overall health-related quality of life after hospital discharge,
which they then use to discount the estimated life-years gained.
Although typically used across large patient populations, this tech-
nique assumes that an individual would prefer to secure a short but
higher quality of life (e.g., two years multiplied by 0.8 = 1.6 QALYs)
than linger in a poor state of health for an extended period of time
(e.g., five years multiplied by 0.3 = 1.5 QALYs). Such a technique
has any number of flaws,59 to say nothing of the further (and far
more contested) question about the upper threshold for justified
spending on efforts to extend life, 60 but it does have the advantage
e.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 869-71 (7th Cir. 1992); Saia v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
47 E Supp. 2d 141, 144-50 (D. Mass. 1999); Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571,
576-79 (Ct. App. 1998); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 365-66 (Haw. 1994); see also W. Kip
Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure for Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Compensa-
tion, 21 J. FORENSIC ECON. (forthcoming 2008) (pts. v-vi); Joseph A. Kuiper, Note, The
Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Doubtful Future of Hedonic Damages Testimony Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1197, 1229-30, 1241-42, 1244-45 (discussing
decisions to exclude the testimony); id. at 1254 (disparaging this work as "pop-economics").
57. See Geistfeld, supra note 51, at 842-43 (offering a hypothetical jury instruction that
contained the following language: "What is the maximum amount of money that a reason-
able person would have been willing to pay to eliminate the 1-in-10,000 risk of ending up
with an injury as severe as the plaintiff's pain-and-suffering injury? ... [I]f you multiply the
amount by 10,000, you will get the amount of money that would fairly compensate the plain-
tiff .... "); Geistfeld, supra note 40, at 350-57 (elaborating on this idea, and explaining that,
outside of the instances where the parties have transacted (such as consumer product pur-
chases), the test asks instead how much a potential victim would have demanded in order to
be willing to accept such a risk of injury); see also Frank A. Sloan et al., Alternative Approaches
to Valuing Intangible Health Losses: The Evidencefor Multiple Sclerosis, 17J. HEALTH EcON. 475,
490 (1998) (finding WTPs-based on a contingent valuation study and after making ad-
justments-ranging from $350,000 to $880,000 to avoid the noneconomic consequences of
MS).
58. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1-6 (2006); Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New
Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. LJ. 1015, 1048-52, 1065-67,
1070-72,1075-76 (1997).
59. See Allan S. Detsky & Andreas Laupacis, Relevance of Cost-effectiveness Analysis to Clini-
cians and Policy Makers, 298 JAMA 221, 223 (2007); Maurice McGregor, Cost-Utility Analysis:
Use QALYs Only with Great Caution, 168 CAN. MED. Ass'NJ. 433 (2003);John La Puma & Ed-
ward F. Lawlor, Quality-Adjusted Life-Years: Ethical Implications for Physicians and Policymakers,
263JAMA 2917 (1990).
60. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Editorial, Cost-Effectiveness in a Flat World-Can ICDs Help the
United States Get Rhythm?, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1513 (2005) (pegging "the usually
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of providing a common metric for comparing different types of
medical interventions without the difficulty encountered in cost-
effectiveness analysis of assigning a monetary value to lives saved.
Courts resolving tort litigation could invert this analysis and ask
to what extent the defendant has reduced the victim's quality of
life. 6' Although absolute reductions in life expectancy generally do
not entitle the victim to damages apart from any associated loss of
earning capacity," jurors could decide that the quality of that
remaining life expectancy also has declined.6 s Thus, if the plaintiff
had a fifteen-year life expectancy, and the tortfeasor caused the
accepted threshold" at $35,000-50,000 per QALY); Peter A. Ubel et al., What Is the Price of
Life and Why Doesn't It Increase at the Rate of Inflation?, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1637,
1628-39 (2003) (arguing that these thresholds are too low and inflexible); Ross Kerber,
We're Extending Our Lives, but at What Price?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 2005, at El (reporting
that "healthcare economists often use $100,000 per added year of life as the maximum bene-
fit worth paying by" Medicare).
61. Cf Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, "Willingness to Award" Nonmonetary Damages and
the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 165, 171-72, 179 (2003)
(using QALY techniques to derive a VSL of $1.9 million from past jury awards in consumer
product cases, and suggesting that these techniques could be used to create a schedule of
pain-and-suffering damages for future cases). See generally Margaret A. Sommerville, Pain and
Suffering at Interfaces of Medicine and Law, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 286, 286 (1986) (suggesting
that pain-and-suffering damages be understood "as compensation for reduction in the plain-
tiffs quality of life"); id. at 289 (asking "whether the concept of quality of life could function
as a possible unifying and organizing principle underlying all the approaches taken with
respect to deciding whether to award damages for non-pecuniary loss... [and] to quantify-
ing these damages"); id. at 302 ("This type of analysis may cause these two types of injury,
that is, physical and mental injury, to be seen as more analogous and, as a consequence,
equally worthy of compensation.").
62. See Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance
Doctrine, 24 REv. LITIG. 369, 373 n.16 (2005); cf Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242 (Ark.
2004) (joining a handful of courts that allow such an award). Some research has suggested
that reductions in quality of life may shorten life expectancy. See, e.g., Kim T.J.L. Ensinck et
al., Is There an Increased Risk of Dying After Depression ?, 156 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1043, 1046-
47 (2002); Lawson R. Wulsin, Editorial, Does Depression Kill?, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1731 (2000); see also Sheldon Cohen et al., Psychological Stress and Disease, 298 JAMA 1685
(2007); Ilan S. Wittstein et al., Neurohumoral Features of Myocardial Stunning Due to Sudden
Emotional Stress, 352 NEw ENG.J. MED. 539, 540, 546-47 (2005) (investigating the association
between stressful events and potentially fatal cardiovascular responses).
63. See Adler, supra note 58, at 49-50 (comparing different health classification sys-
tems); id. at 69 ("[M]any, perhaps most, health conditions lack a single contingent-valuation
or revealed preference study. By contrast .... QALY surveys have been conducted for a large
number of conditions."); Mauro V. Mendlowicz & Murray B. Stein, Quality of Life in Individu-
als with Anxiety Disorders, 157 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 669, 678-79 (2000) (discussing various
instruments used to measure relative decrements in quality of life across types of emotional
distress, and noting that "PTSD may exert a heavier toll on quality of life than other anxiety
disorders"). But cf George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118
Q.J. ECON. 1209, 1212 (2003) ("[N]onpatients' predictions of the quality of life associated
with serious medical conditions are lower than actual patients' self-reported quality of life.");
LauraJ. Damschroder et al., The Impact of Considering Adaptation in Health State Valuation, 61
Soc. ScI. & MED. 267, 267-68 (2005); infra note 149 (discussing research on "hedonic adap-
tation").
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victim's overall quality of life to decline from 0.9 to 0.85,6 then the
defendant would have deprived the plaintiff of 0.75 QALYs; if
(borrowing from the WTP research) experts persuade the jury that
each QALY has a value of $100,000,65 then the nonpecuniary award
would amount to $75,000.
III. AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES AND EMOTIONAL INJURY
Plaintiffs generally have a duty to mitigate their damages,
though courts have shown some reluctance when applying the
mitigation requirement to nonphysical harms. With advances in
the treatment of both pain and suffering, however, this judicial
hesitancy may make less sense today. If nothing else, application of
the avoidable consequences rule to claims seeking noneconomic
damages might provide a firmer basis for monetizing these awards,
even if many aspects of emotional harm remain beyond the thera-
peutic capabilities of health care professionals.
A. Basic Contours of the Duty to Mitigate
The avoidable consequences doctrine limits recovery for an in-
jury to its likely severity after the victim makes reasonable efforts to
mitigate damages, and it separately authorizes recovery for expen-
64. Cf. FDA, Final Rule, Patient Examination and Surgeons' Gloves: Test Procedures
and Acceptance Criteria, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,865, 75,874 (Dec. 19, 2006) ("According to one
measurement scale of well-being, reduced mental lucidity, depression, crying, lack of con-
centration, or other signs of adverse psychological sequelae may detract as much as 8
percent from overall feelings of well-being."); KennethJ. Smith & Mark S. Roberts, The Cost-
Effectiveness of Sildenafil, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 933, 934-36 (2000) (assuming that
erectile dysfunction results in an average disutility of 0.13). See generally Matthew D. Adler,
Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI-KENT L. Rv.
977 (2004); id. at 1029-30 (citing contingent valuation studies involving pain, depression,
and anxiety); id. at 1043-50 (explaining that QALY estimates for these sorts of conditions
could be converted into dollars using the VSL); Adler, supra note 58, at 57-60 (discussing
QALY-to-dollar conversions, and illustrating with analyses conducted by the FDA that
monetized the avoidance of functional disability as well as pain and suffering associated with
heart disease).
65. See Adler, supra note 58, at 67 ("[A] conversion factor of $100,000 per QALY looks
closer to optimal, and lower factors such as $50,000 or even $10,000 should be consid-
ered."); Margaret M. Byrne et al., Willingness to Pay Per Quality-Adjusted Life Year in a Study of
Knee Osteoarthritis, 25 MED. DECISION MAKING 655, 656, 662 (2005) (finding a WTP of no
more than $6,000 per QALY to avoid a nonfatal condition); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Essay,
Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205, 228-31, 245-49 (2004); David
A. Fahrenthold, Cosmic Markdown: EPA Says Life Is Worth Less, WASH. POST, July 19, 2008, at
Al. This approach is more structured (and constrained) than per diem arguments.
[VOL. 42:2
Pain-and-Suffering Damages
ditues mde i pusuitof .• • 66ditures made n rsui  f mitigation. Indeed, some courts have
allowed claims seeking nothing other than the recovery of reason-
able (anticipatory) mitigation expenses.67 The doctrine has less,
however, to do with encouraging plaintiffs to minimize avoidable
consequences than it serves as a mechanism for quantifying the
appropriate scope of future damages and forcing the victim to in-
ternalize the costs associated with any unreasonable failure to
mitigate.6s If victims know in advance that they will not profit from
allowing their injuries to go uncorrected, then (as the cheapest loss
avoider) they will have every reason to take reasonable steps to
minimize their damages.69 Because the avoidable consequences
66. See, e.g., Preston v. Keith, 584 A.2d 439, 441-43 (Conn. 1991); McWilliams v.
Wilhelm, 893 P.2d 1147, 1148-49 (Wyo. 1995); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT § 3 cmt. b (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) ("[Olne
injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could
have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the
tort."); id. cmt. b ("[T]he damages for the harm suffered are reduced to the value of the
efforts he should have made or the amount of the expense he should have incurred, in
addition to the harm previously caused."); id. § 919(2) ("One who has already suffered in-
jury by the tort of another is entitled to recover for expenditures reasonably made ... in a
reasonable effort to avert further harm.").
67. See, e.g., Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the plaintiff had standing to pursue a class action lawsuit for medical monitoring ex-
penses on behalf of cardiac bypass patients who had received an allegedly defective aortic
connector and faced an increased risk of injury); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for
Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits, 88 VA. L. REv. 1975, 1977 (2002) (drawing the
parallel to mitigation); David M. Studdert et al., Medical Monitoring for Pharmaceutical Injuries:
Tort Law for the Public's Health?, 289 JAMA 889 (2003). But see Paz v. Brush Eng'd Materials,
Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 6-7 (Miss. 2007) (canvassing the division of authority in other jurisdic-
tions); Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2008) (declining to recognize such
claims); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring. The Right Way and the Wrong Way, 70 Mo.
L. REv. 349 (2005) (criticizing courts for allowing such claims).
68. See Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 377 (7th Cir. 1998) ("An obvious example
would be a person who, when cut by a defective product, fails to take antiseptic measures,
thereby allowing the wound to become infected. The injured person may recover damages
from the tortfeasor, but only for the harm that he would have suffered had he exercised
reasonable care."); Charles T. McCormick, Avoiding Injurious Consequences, 37 W. VA. L.Q.
331, 331-34, 340-41 (1931). In most cases, victims already have an incentive to minimize
avoidable consequences because of their preference for limiting the severity of an injury
coupled with the uncertainty about their ability to shift any or all damages to the tortfeasor.
Indeed, the doctrine also may reflect principles of proximate causation insofar as the defen-
dant could not have foreseen the victim's intervening decision to decline subsequently
recommended treatment, which may become a superseding cause that cuts off the defen-
dant's obligation to pay for any aggravation of the original injury.
69. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also imposes something of a mitigation
requirement by determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity
after taking into account the availability and use of any corrective measures. SeeJill Elaine
Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L. REv. 217, 219 & n.8,
229-66 (2004) (arguing that this inquiry properly includes any unreasonable failures to use
corrective measures); cf Sarah Shaw, Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to
Plaintiffs Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REv.
1981, 2006-20, 2027-39 (2002) (disputing this interpretation).
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rule operates as an affirmative defense, the burden of proof falls
on the defendant."0
In applying the mitigation requirement in the torts context,
courts usually address the obligation to undergo surgical interven-
tions, tending to conclude that victims need not subject themselves
to such procedures if they pose more than minimal risk.7" Reason-
able people also might decline medical treatments that have little
chance of success or that present significant practical difficulties
(such as inconvenience and expense). Less frequently do questions
arise in connection with noninvasive treatments.7 2 Nonetheless, be-
cause prescription drugs often pose a risk of potentially serious
side effects, 73 courts will have to decide whether a reasonable per-
son would accept those risks given the anticipated therapeutic
benefits 4
B. Judicial Hostility to Psychiatric Mitigation
Although rarely litigated, courts have shown some hesitancy in
applying a duty to mitigate pain and suffering.5 In 1973, in one of
70. See, e.g., Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179, 1187-88 (Ind. 2006); Greenwood v.
Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 205-07 (Iowa 2001); Monahan v. Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
628 S.E.2d 330, 336-37 (Va. 2006); Hawkins v. Marshall, 962 P.2d 834, 838-39 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998).
71. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Taylor, 711 P.2d 660, 661-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (dictum);
McDonnell v. McPartlin, 708 N.E.2d 412, 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Couture v. Novotny, 211
N.W.2d 172, 174-76 (Minn. 1973); Automatic Merchandisers, Inc. v. Ward, 646 P.2d 553, 555
(Nev. 1982).
72. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Duty of Injured Person to Submit to Nonsurgical Medical
Treatment to Minimize Tort Damages, 62 A.L.R.3d 70 (1975 & Supp. 2007).
73. See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 290-94, 321-36 (2d
ed. 2007).
74. See, e.g., Keans v. Bottiarelli, 645 A.2d 1029, 1031 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (affirming
conclusion that the plaintiff's failure to take prescribed antibiotics represented a failure to
mitigate damages associated with the need for hospitalization after a negligent tooth extrac-
tion); Herring v. Poirrier, 797 So. 2d 797, 806-07 (Miss. 2000) (upholding mitigation
instruction where, among other things, the plaintiff had neglected to tell his physician that
he discontinued a prescribed course of pain medication because it had caused drowsiness).
Even when the benefits unmistakably outweigh the risks, patients far too often neglect to
complete a prescribed course of treatment. See Amy Dockser Marcus, The Real Drug Problem
Forgetting to Take Them, WALL ST.J., Oct. 21, 2003, at DI; Andrew Pollack, Take Your Pills, All
Your Pills: Drug Makers Nag Patients to Stay the Course, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at Cl.
75. See Shipley, supra note 72, at 97 ("In most of the few cases involving a claim that
plaintiff should have submitted to psychiatric treatment to mitigate damages, the courts
have shown a reluctance to rule that damages be diminished because of the failure to un-
dergo such treatment."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 8, at 2 (summarizing the reasons why courts historically re-
stricted recovery for emotional distress, including that, "while mitigation may be important




the earliest reported opinions to discuss the issue squarely, a Lou-
isiana appellate court affirmed a judgment in favor of a pedestrian
who had been struck by a vehicle in a parking lot and received an
award of $40,000 for lost wages (past and future), $18,000 for pain
and suffering, and more than $2,400 for medical expenses. 76 Al-
though the victim had recovered from his physical injuries, he
continued to complain of pain, leading to a psychiatric referral
and diagnosis of depression.7' After unsuccessfully treating the
plaintiff with antidepressants and tranquilizers, the psychiatrist
recommended electroshock therapy.8 Notwithstanding the psy-
chiatrist's explanation that the treatment was highly effective
(purportedly working in 80-90% of cases) and that the risks re-
lated to the induction of seizures were minimal relative to some of
the hazards commonly associated with pharmaceutical and surgical
interventions, the plaintiff declined to undergo this treatment.
79
The appellate court in Dohmann v. Richard rejected the defen-
dants' argument that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate damages
by declining the electroshock therapy recommended by his psy-
chiatrist. After explaining that it could find no precedent for a
psychiatric mitigation requirement, the court suggested a funda-
mental difference between widely accepted treatments for physical
injuries and treatments designed to alter personality.0 (Of course,
the premise underlying the plaintiffs claim was that the defendant's
76. See Dohmann v. Richard, 282 So. 2d 789, 789-92, 794 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
77. See id. at 792 (explaining that "obviously his physical injuries were not overly seri-
ous and should have been of a moderate duration").
78. See id. at 792-93.
79. See id. at 793 ("[T]he plaintiff and his family were extremely frightened of the
prospect of electro-shock treatments.").
80. See id. ("Plaintiff is not being asked to have a fractured bone placed in a cast, a
hernia repaired, or any other conventional form of surgery. Instead it is proposed that he
subject himself to electro-shock, a form of treatment designed to work a change in his per-
sonality."). At one point in its discussion, the court also seemed unpersuaded by the
reassuring picture painted by the plaintiffs treating psychiatrist, even though it pointed to
no evidence in the record that cast doubt on his optimistic risk-benefit analysis. See id.
("[W]e are dealing with what is perhaps the most misunderstood field of medicine, i.e.
treatment of the mind."). Later in the same paragraph, however, it hastened to add that "we
do not intend to in any way demean the value of such treatments or to question the effec-
tiveness with which they are generally credited within the medical profession, but refer only
to the attitudes held towards them by the public at large." Id. at 794 ("As testified to by Dr.
McCray the treatment is of undoubted value and benefit in many cases and may very well be
so in the case at bar."). If electroconvulsive therapy remained genuinely "experimental,"
then a reasonable patient could decline it, but the court had only alluded to this possibility.
Cf Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the duty to disclose
alternatives does not include any obligation to advise patients of the availability of experi-
mental treatments); Schiffv. Prados, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 182-84 (Ct. App. 2001) (same).
See generally Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experi-
mental Therapy, 28 AM.J.L. & MED. 361 (2002).
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negligence had adversely affected his personality, causing him on-
going pain and suffering that made it impossible for him to return
to work.) In addition, the court emphasized the social stigma at-
tached to such treatments: "we bear in mind that our society has
not progressed to a point in which it accepts mental illnesses, and
particularly the drastic treatment thereof by such measures as
shock therapy, with the same tolerance that it now regards physical
surgery or treatment. 8 ' The court concluded its discussion of the
avoidable consequences issue by emphasizing that "we are not pre-
pared to hold at this time that psychiatric therapy of this sort falls
within the spirit, or the letter, of that line of jurisprudence which
requires injured persons to mitigate their damages.,
82
One decade later, the Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed
the same basic issue, and it reached a similar conclusion, though
on different grounds and without citing Dohmann.s3 In Jacobs, the
plaintiff's car collided with a negligently operated city bus, alleg-
edly resulting in severe and disabling anxiety.s4 The trial judge
awarded her $100,000, half of which reflected pain-and-suffering
damages, but rejected a further claim for lost future wages after
concluding that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate her emotional
injuries by undergoing additional psychotherapy; the appellate
court disagreed with that finding and ordered additur of almost
$160,000.85 The state supreme court concurred, emphasizing that
none of the medical witnesses had testified that continued psychi-
atric treatment would have reduced her anxiety enough to allow
the plaintiff to return to work.6 Unlike Dohmann, then, the issue
81. Dohmann, 282 So. 2d at 794 ("Accordingly we cannot disregard the effect that such
treatment, given the present attitudes of our society, is likely to have on plaintiff's future
relations with his peers.").
82. Id. (emphasis added); see also Tortorice v. Capital Brickwork Constr., Inc., 251 A.2d
812, 813-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (same, in worker's compensation case). In contrast, many
years earlier an English court found a failure to mitigate after the plaintiff had declined to
undergo electroshock treatments. See Marcroft v. Scruttons, Ltd., [1954] 1 Lloyd's List L.R.
395, 399 (C.A.). Decades later, and in spite of further research and improvements, this form
of therapy remains underutilized. See Max Fink & Michael Alan Taylor, Electroconvulsive Ther-
apy: Evidence and Challenges, 298 JAMA 330 (2007); Sarah H. Lisanby, Electroconvulsive Therapy
for Depression, 357 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1939 (2007).
83. SeeJacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So. 2d 843, 846 (La. 1983).
84. The dissent noted, however, that initially "[t] here was no claim for or evidence of a
psychological disability related to the accident." Id. at 847 (Lemmon, J., dissenting) ("The
psychiatric testimony in the first trial, which was introduced solely to corroborate plaintiffs
claim that her fear of needles justified her refusal of a myelogram, was evidence in support
of her claim for damages resulting from a back injury.").
85. See id. at 844-45. As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained, the appellate court
failed to recognize that the trial judge already had awarded $50,000 for lost earning capacity.
See id. at 846-47.
86. See id. at 846; see also Zerilli v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 973 E Supp. 311, 323
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying the defendant's motion for a new trial or a judgment notwith-
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did not turn on whether the plaintiff had acted reasonably in de-
clining to undergo treatment-even if the decision to ignore the
advice of her doctors was entirely unreasonable, it did not proxi-
mately cause any more severe an injury (for which the defendants
817
should escape an obligation to pay).
One decade ago, a trio of federal district courts encountered
questions about psychiatric mitigation. Two of these cases arose
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) ,8 and, because the
judgments emerged from bench trials, the judicial opinions con-
tain detailed summaries of the evidentiary record. As elaborated in
the paragraphs that follow, the plaintiffs in all three cases had fairly
minor lasting physical injuries but offered diagnoses of serious
emotional distress, and they underwent psychological counseling
but declined to use some or all of the medications prescribed by
their psychiatrists. In all three cases, the courts agreed with the de-
fendants' arguments that the mitigation requirement applied to
the claims for nonpecuniary damages, but they decided that each
plaintiff had acted reasonably in declining to use the recom-
mended psychotropic drugs.
The first case, arising from a catastrophic accident involving a
commercial airliner that resulted from admitted negligence by the
air traffic controllers, focused on what damages to award to one of
standing the verdict in an employment discrimination case, which resulted in an award of
$95,000 for emotional distress, after finding no evidentiary foundation to support a re-
quested jury instruction on the duty to mitigate where the employee allegedly declined to
attend a psychological counseling program at the worksite: "even assuming a duty on the
part of a plaintiff to mitigate such damages-a duty for whose existence [defendant] pro-
vides no authority- ... it would have been an invitation to sheer speculation to have
allowed the jury to consider, without any testimony on the question, the extent to which the
psychological counseling would have alleviated Ms. Zerilli's condition had she agreed to
engage in it"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Slattery, 172 A.2d 266, 270 (Del. 1961) (affirming plaintiffs'
verdict where the jury had received a mitigation instruction, and rejecting the defendant's
argument that it should have received a partial directed verdict on the claim for traumatic
neurosis (anxiety) where an automobile accident victim had declined to undergo belatedly
recommended psychiatric treatment of doubtful efficacy); Jackson v. Kansas City, 947 P.2d
31, 36 (Kan. 1997).
87. The court separately noted that the plaintiff had discontinued psychotherapy for
financial reasons. SeeJacobs, 432 So. 2d at 846. Although impecunity might have excused her
decision, see Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2000), that
would not prevent a court from awarding damages to cover these expenses in the future
(and, thereby, reduce its award for future lost wages or pain and suffering), except again for
the lack of evidence that it would have helped this patient return to work or at least limit her
future suffering. Although the opinion failed to mention the nature of the recommended
psychiatric treatment, and the reported opinions of the lower courts did not clarify the mat-
ter, it appears that the trial judge also had awarded $8,000 to cover future medical
(presumably psychiatric) expenses. SeeJacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 374 So. 2d
167, 168 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (BeerJ., concurring).
88. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-80 (2000).
WINTER 2009]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the flight attendants who had survived the crash. 89 The plaintiff's
physical injuries had healed and he did not seek any award for past
medical expenses, but, because of the lasting emotional trauma
associated with the accident (diagnosed as PTSD with depres-
sion), 90 the court awarded almost $31,000 for future medical
expenses in light of the continuing need for psychological counsel-
ing and psychiatric evaluation.9' In addition, after explaining the
difficulty encountered in trying to monetize pain-and-suffering
damages, the court awarded $220,000,9' only to increase that
amount a few months later to $300,000 in response to the plain-
reconsderaon. 9 3 In rejecting the government'stiff's motion for sieat . rjcin  v n'
mitigation defense, the court simply found that the plaintiff's
"choice not to take antidepressant medications is not a wholly un-
reasonable choice. He has, instead, made major efforts in other
ways and obviously declined the reliance on medication based on
the same attitude of self-reliance and determination that have
brought him this far in his recovery."9 4 Perhaps, as in Jacobs, the
89. See In reAir Crash at Charlotte, 982 F. Supp. 1101, 1103-05 (D.S.C. 1997).
90. See id. at 1106-08 & n.5. The defendant's psychiatric witness, a recognized expert
in PTSD, had recommended that the plaintiff "should consider the use of medications,
which plaintiff has rejected to this point." Id. at 1107; see also id. at 1107-08 (adding that this
expert also thought that the plaintiff already could return to some form of work and, with
proper treatment, could return to his previous position within two years). The court evi-
dently found that expert's prognosis unduly optimistic. See id. at 1108-09; id. at 1110
(" [W] hile no one disputes that the post traumatic stress syndrome that plaintiff has suffered
will remain with him for the rest of his life, there are significant questions as to the degree to
which the plaintiff will be able to learn to cope with this trauma.").
91. See id. at 1110 ("Plaintiff will continue to need routine sessions with the treating
psychologist on a weekly basis in the near future, decreasing to monthly and, eventually, to
rarely although possibly having some need, off and on, for the remainder of his life."). In
addition, the court awarded almost $270,000 for lost earning capacity. See id. at 1108-10.
92. See id. at 1110-11 (claiming also to approach this task with a fair degree of skepti-
cism about the genuineness of allegedly debilitating emotional injuries); id. at 1112-13
("[D]amages for emotional distress are perhaps the most difficult damages to quantify. They
are unique to each plaintiff, requiring careful inquiry into the event experienced, the plain-
tiff's reaction to those events, and the plaintiffs prospects for recovery."). Although it did
not separate the figure, the court suggested that much of this amount covered past nonpe-
cuniary damages. See id. at 1110 ("[T]he most significant pain and suffering in the present
case is severe emotional suffering over the more than two year period since the time of the
crash.").
93. See id. at 1114-15.
94. Id. at 1112 ("Therefore, the court does not find this personal choice to be a failure
to mitigate damages under the present circumstances."). The other "major efforts" included
buying and repairing a house, going back to college (notwithstanding difficulties in concen-
trating), getting engaged (notwithstanding fears of abandonment), and taking flights as a
passenger (notwithstanding extreme anxiety). See id. at 1105-08. Of course, in addition to
crediting this evidence that the plaintiff was toughing it out and making other attempts to
cope with his undoubted emotional trauma, the court's award of future medical expenses
(and its finding that he eventually would manage to return to some form of gainful em-
ployment) assumed that the plaintiff would continue to seek the assistance of mental health
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court did not believe that the additional use of psychotropic drugs
would have made much of a difference, but it never explained its
conclusion in causation terms.
The second case arose from an automobile accident caused by
the negligent driving of a federal employee.95 The plaintiff suf-
fered only minor physical injuries in the collision, but she
subsequently experienced anxiety and worsening depression, and
her continuing physical complaints suggested a somatoform dis-
order (i.e., unconscious exaggeration of symptoms).o6 At the time
of trial, the plaintiff was under the care of several different spe-
cialists, and she was taking a number of different prescription
medications, including a mood stabilizer (Tegretol®) and an anti-
depressant (Zoloft®).9' More than three years earlier, however, she
had refused a different psychiatrist's recommendation to take
precisely these sorts of medications, and, at the time of trial, the
plaintiff continued to decline the earlier recommendation also to
take an antipsychotic drug."8
In light of this record (and having conceded negligence), the
government relied on a mitigation defense at trial, arguing that the
"plaintiff should not be awarded any damages after November 1993,
when she refused to take the combination of three psychiatric
care specialists and experience further improvement. See id. at 1110 ("The court concludes
that plaintiff will recover in significant ways over time."). Thus, in the sense that it decided
to award less than the full pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages sought by the plaintiff, see
id. at 1103 & n.1, the court did apply the avoidable consequences rule, see id. at 1112 ("The
court has taken these [mitigation] factors into account in reaching its above stated award.").
95. See Salas v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
96. See id. at 204-10; id. at 206 ("As to the plaintiff's psychiatric state, various labels
have been applied [also including PTSD, borderline personality, and schizo-affective disor-
der], but all of the doctors do agree that the motor vehicle accident triggered a psychiatric
condition."); id. at 207 ("In sum, the medical testimony demonstrated that ... the minor
trauma of the automobile accident triggered a major psychiatric deterioration which totally
disabled the plaintiff.").
97. See id. at 205.
She has been on and off antidepressants in the past, but chose not to take them on a
long-term basis, apparently because of side effects. For instance, the record disclosed
that the plaintiff took Pamelor, a tricyclic antidepressant, for more than one year fol-
lowing the accident, and it did make her feel less depressed. However, she claims that
it made her allergic to the sun and she stopped taking it.
Id. (adding that, "three weeks prior to trial, she began taking Zoloft, one of the new genera-
tion of antidepressants known as selective serotonin [] reuptake inhibitors").
98. See id. at 207. It took almost two years before the plaintiff began taking the mood
stabilizer and fully three years before taking the antidepressant. See id. at 212 (adding that
the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist had disagreed with the earlier recommendation to use an
antipsychotic).
WINTER 2009]
456 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 42:2
medications recommended by Dr. Dickinson.' 99 In considering this
issue, the court explained that it could find only a single decision
from New York that addressed psychiatric mitigation, ' ° which it
distinguished because the victim there had declined treatment al-
together rather than just "a particular course of treatment."
0 1
Nonetheless, the court accepted the proposition that a plaintiff
would have a duty to mitigate emotional injury.
The court offered a number of reasons, however, for concluding
that this plaintiff had not failed to mitigate. First, it questioned Dr.
Dickinson's favorable prognosis in the case of treatment,0 2 which
99. Id. at 211. The defendant offered a variety of other arguments (including com-
parative negligence) that the court also found unpersuasive. See id. at 207-13. For instance,
the government insisted that, given her longstanding psychiatric problems, the plaintiff
eventually would have deteriorated even in the absence of this accident. See id. at 209-10.
The court rejected this argument because it depended on the testimony of the government's
expert witness, which the court found less credible than the plaintiffs witnesses in part be-
cause Dr. Dickinson had abandoned the plaintiff for declining to comply with her
recommended course of psychotropic drug treatment. See id. at 210-11.
100. See id. at 211. In that case, the tenant of a public apartment complex claimed that
negligent maintenance gave an intruder access to the building and resulted in her rape. See
Skaria v. State, 442 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839-40 (Ct. Cl. 1981). After a bench trial, the court held
for the plaintiff, but it declined to award any damages for pain and suffering (including
phobias linked to the trauma) experienced after January 1, 1979, because, after relocating
six months prior to that date, she had failed to locate another therapist as recommended by
the psychologist who initially had treated her. See id. at 841-42; see also Gardner v. Federated
Dep't Stores, Inc., 717 E Supp. 136, 139-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (affirming $150,000 awarded for
past pain and suffering where the victim of a false arrest alleged extreme anxiety, but order-
ing remittitur of $500,000 award for future pain and suffering to $10,000 because he had
never sought out psychiatric care), aff'd in relevant part, 907 F.2d 1348, 1354 (2d Cir. 1990);
Tucker v. Town of Branford, No. CV-960252918S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1139, at *13-15,
*22-23 (Apr. 23, 1998) (awarding, after a bench trial, $1,050 for past psychiatric expenses
and $12,000 for pain and suffering to the driver of an automobile who developed PTSD
after a collision with a negligently operated police vehicle that caused her car to become
submerged, but declining to award future damages (including an estimated $3,900 for addi-
tional psychiatric treatment) because the plaintiff had refused further psychotherapy or the
use of anti-anxiety drugs); Fox v. Evans, 111 P.3d 267, 270-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (affirm-
ingjury verdict that reduced damages by 22% for failure to mitigate where an auto accident
victim had refused to accept a diagnosis of depression and had discontinued prescribed
antidepressants and psychotherapy); Casimere v. Herman, 137 N.W.2d 73, 77-78 (Wis. 1965)
(reversing an award of $4,500 for future pain and suffering where the plaintiffs psychologist
had testified that her emotional injury could be treated but failed to specify the likely dura-
tion or cost of psychotherapy).
101. Salas, 974 F. Supp. at 211; see also id. at 212 ("[T]he plaintiff readily agreed to un-
dergo psychiatric assessment upon the recommendation of one of her physicians. In fact,
since the accident, plaintiff has consistently seen many doctors and for the most part fol-
lowed their medical advice."); id. ("She has also consistently engaged in psychotherapy with
Dr. Mostert and others, which is a recognized, conventional form of treatment for somato-
form disorder.").
102. See id. at 212 ("[T]he prognosis of every other physician who examined the plain-
tiff was much more guarded.... Dr. Dickinson's prognosis for a virtually assured and
complete recovery is not supported by the record."). On this point, then, the evidence in
this case fell somewhere in between the two earlier Louisiana cases, one that had uncontro-
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meant that the defendant had not established that any arguable
failure to mitigate caused an aggravated injury. Second, the court
noted that psychiatric experts testifying for both parties conceded
that patients may have legitimate reasons for rejecting psychotro-
pic medication, including bothersome side effects.1l 3 Third, the
court recognized that the victim's underlying emotional injury or
cognitive impairment could excuse her failure to act in an objec-
tively reasonable way.10 4 Although in the end it found no failure to
mitigate in this case, the court's award of future compensatory
damages assumed that the combination of psychotherapy and pre-
scribed medications would allow the plaintiff to improve gradually
and recover fully within five years. 
5
verted testimony about the high likelihood of efficacy with electroshock therapy (but re-
jected the mitigation defense on other grounds) and the other that found no evidence
whatsoever to suggest that psychotherapy would have helped the plaintiff.
103. See id. at 211-12; id. at 210 ("Dr. Dickinson did concede that some patients are le-
gitimately concerned about the side-effects of medication and that many patients do refuse
medications.").
104. See id. at 212 ("[T]he plaintiff believes her cognitive difficulties stem from a brain
injury and that her other physical symptoms are also causally related to the motor vehicle
accident. Thus, the plaintiff could have reasonably believed that her condition was physio-
logical, rather than psychiatric, in nature."); see also Templeton v. Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co., 628 N.E.2d 442, 453-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Cannon v. New Jersey Bell Tel., 530 A.2d
345, 351-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d
1174,1177 n.2 (Pa. 1992).
105. See Salas, 974 R Supp. at 213-14; id. at 214 ("Considering the testimony of the ex-
perts, whose estimates as to plaintiffs ability to return to work ranged from soon to never, I
believe that [with continued treatment] the plaintiffs pain and suffering can be eliminated
and she can be returned to work in five years."); id. (awarding pain and suffering on an
annually declining schedule, for a total of almost $90,000); see also Neal v. Dir., D.C. Dep't of
Corrections, No. 93-2420, 1995 WL 517249, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995) (reducing, after a
bench trial for equitable relief under Title VII, the future lost earnings requested by the
victim of sexual harassment because experts had testified that her major depression and
anxiety likely would improve with Prozac® or a comparable drug even though she previously
had declined medication because of concerns about side effects, but not reducing for failure
to mitigate the back pay requested because the plaintiffs psychotherapist had concurred
with her decision), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801,
813 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In support of this approach for setting pain-and-suffering damages, the
Salas court cited a much older FrCA case involving an automobile collision, which also
included a limited discussion of the psychiatric mitigation issue. See Letoski v. FDA, 488 F.
Supp. 952, 953-57 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that the plaintiffs minor orthopedic injuries
triggered a severe anxiety neurosis, which he belatedly and unsuccessfully tried to treat with
tranquilizers and antidepressants); id. at 960 (observing that the "plaintiff has not received
optimal treatment up to this point, largely because of his own unwillingness to cooperate
manifested in some degree by his quickness to indicate inability to tolerate any drug regi-
men"); id. at 961 (rejecting, however, the government's argument that he had failed before
trial to mitigate psychiatric damages); id. at 960-62 (concluding that intensive psychother-
apy and behavioral therapy would allow the plaintiff to return to work within five years, and
awarding compensatory damages accordingly, including future psychiatric expenses of
$16,000 and future pain and suffering of $85,000); see also Browning v. United States, 361 F.
Supp. 17, 24 n.5, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (engaging in a similar analysis of a claim brought
under the Public Vessels Act).
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In a third case from the late 1990s, based on a misdiagnosis of
the plaintiff as HIV positive that caused him lasting depression
(even though subsequent retesting had given the patient a clean
bill of health), a federal district court entered judgment on a ver-
dict that included an award of $285,000 for pain and suffering as
well as $5,000 for expenses that included mental health care.1 0 6 In
rejecting the defendant's motion for a new trial, the court found
no merit in objections lodged against the jury instructions con-
cerning the mitigation requirement, ' 7 and it explained that the
plaintiff had received some psychiatric counseling, but, without
further elaboration, the court concluded that "[h]is desire not to
take medication, standing alone, does not support [the defen-
dant's] argument. The jury could have reasonably concluded that
Baker did what he could to alleviate his distress ... ,,0' In short,
these federal courts applied the mitigation requirement to claims
for nonpecuniary damages but, for various reasons, appeared to do
so in a more lenient manner than normally happens in the case of
treatments for physical injuries.
Religious objections to mental health treatments might pose a
stronger version of the stigma concern expressed in Dohmann and
perhaps implicit in the federal cases decided in the late 1990s. For
instance, adherents of Scientology vigorously denounce modern
psychiatry,'0 9 and they have mounted publicity campaigns attacking
psychotropic drugs.10 Putting aside longstanding questions about
whether the Church of Scientology qualifies as a bona fide relig-
ion,' courts generally have rejected the argument that tort victims
106. See Baker v. Dorfman, No. 1:97 Civ. 7512, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4451, at *10-14
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999), aff'd, 239 E3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2000). The award, which emerged
after successful malpractice litigation against an attorney who had missed deadlines for filing
the negligent misdiagnosis claim, also included $70,000 for lost wages and $25,000 in puni-
tive damages.
107. Seeid. at*16-18.
108. Id. at *17. The appellate court noted that the defendant had not pressed his miti-
gation argument. See 239 E3d at 418 n.1. In contrast, one court held that a trial judge had
committed error in declining to use a defendant's requested jury instruction that focused on
the plaintiff's failure to undergo psychotherapy. See Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d
1279, 1315-17 (Haw. 1997) (emphasizing, however, the fact that the general mitigation
instruction had failed to specify the impact of the avoidable consequences rule).
109. See Timothy Bowles, Scientology Ethics and Psychiatric Injustice, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv.
1011 (1996) (offering a true believer's views on the subject); Daniel Ruth, Funny? Yes, and
Quite Weird, Too, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 22, 2007, at B1.
110. See Thomas M. Burton, Medical lap: Anti-Depression Drug of Eli Lilly Loses Sales After
Attack by Sect, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1991, at Al; Michael Tackett, Scientologist Campaign Shakes
DrugFirm, Advertising Industry, CHI. TRIB.,June 30, 1991, at 17.
111. See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on Se-
lected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 85, 102-10, 145-54 (1997); Mark
Oppenheimer, Weird, Sure. A Cult, No, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2007, at B2;Janet Reitman, Inside
Scientolog,, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 9, 2006, at 55.
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need not accept reasonable medical interventions that might of-
fend their religious scruples.1 1 2 Judges do not, of course, thereby
force plaintiffs to accept these objectionable treatments,1 3 but they
also do not obligate the tortfeasor to subsidize the victim's arguably
unreasonable choice."4 Thus, a psychiatric mitigation rule would
not force someone with religious (or other) objections to accept,
for instance, psychotropic drugs, but it also would not allow the
victim of emotional injuries to seek recovery for more than the
amount it typically would have cost to treat such a condition, put-
ting aside for the moment questions about what to do with
untreatable pain and suffering.
Other courts have taken what one might call half-steps toward a
psychiatric mitigation requirement. For instance, where simple
surgery could have corrected a physical injury, courts may limit the
recovery for future pain and suffering associated with that uncor-
rected underlying condition."5 Moreover, in situations where the
plaintiff has attempted to mitigate emotional injury (even if not
compelled to do so by virtue of the avoidable consequences doc-
trine), recoveries will include expenditures for treatment." 6 In fact,
112. See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
plaintiff had a duty to mitigate by accepting a blood transfusion even if, as a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, she had a religious objection); see also Gary Knapp, Annotation, Refusal of Medical
Treatment on Religious Grounds As Affecting Right to Recover for Personal Injury or Death, 3
A.L.R.5th 721 (1992 & Supp. 2007).
113. Indeed, courts routinely reverse judges who disregard patients' religious prefer-
ences when hospitals seek court orders to compel blood transfusions. See, e.g., Stamford
Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 831-32 (Conn. 1996); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 828 (Fla.
1993); id. at 824-25 n.8 (canvassing case law).
114. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1693, 1730 (1995) ("[A]lthough the decedent's decision to honor her religious
beliefs is not unreasonable, defendant has no duty to subsidize her choice to sacrifice her life
in the name of religion."). But see Anne C. Loomis, Comment, Thou Shalt Take Thy Victim as
Thou Findest Him: Religious Conviction as a Pre-Existing State Not Subject to the Avoidable Conse-
quences Doctrine, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 473, 493-511 (2007).
115. See, e.g., Verrett v. McDonough Marine Serv., 705 F.2d 1437, 1444 (5th Cir. 1983)
(denying any recovery for future pain where plaintiff declined routine surgery for a rup-
tured disc); Lawrence v. City of Shreveport, 948 So. 2d 1179, 1189 (La. Ct. App. 2007)
(agreeing that plaintiff should not receive pain-and-suffering damages during the eleven
month delay in undergoing recommended knee surgery). In addition, courts may harbor
suspicions about plaintiffs who do not even bother to seek out medical treatment for an
allegedly painful condition. See Olmstead v. Miller, 383 N.W.2d 817, 821-22 (N.D. 1986).
116. See Spears v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 646 So. 2d 1104, 1107-08 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (affirming an award of more than $7,500 for psychotherapy plus $100,000 in general
damages for residual pain and suffering); Tracy v. Parish ofJefferson, 523 So. 2d 266, 274-76
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding an award of $20,800 for future psychiatric expenses for
intensive therapy and possible hospitalization in addition to, among other items, $350,000
for physical pain and suffering and $250,000 for mental anguish); Brookshire Grocery Co. v.
Goss, 208 S.W.3d 706, 720-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding an award of $400,000 for
future medical expenses primarily to treat pain and anxiety associated with a back injury
plus $25,000 for residual future pain and suffering); see also King, supra note 6, at 2 n.3, 45 &
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where victims commit suicide because of an inability to cope with
their plight, courts may award wrongful death damages. ' 7 Al-
though no one would argue that the avoidable consequences
doctrine demands that victims take their own lives in order to
minimize the duration of intolerable pain and suffering,"" courts
that allow wrongful death claims in such circumstances grant the
victim's estate a measure of damages that reflects the proximate
economic (and perhaps other) consequences of the profound
mental anguish that the tortfeasor had inflicted on the victim."9
C. Medicine's Take on Pain and Suffering
In the aggregate, pain-and-suffering damages account for more
than half of the monetary value of all tort awards. 2 0 By way of com-
parison, expenditures on mental health services amount to far less
n.225; cf Musa v. Jefferson County Bank, 607 N.W.2d 349, 352 n.7 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (re-
citing ajury instruction in an intentional tort case on the duty to mitigate emotional distress
damages, but reversing an award for $4,000 in mental health treatment expenses), rev'd, 620
N.W.2d 797 (Wis. 2001). A few commentators have suggested, however, that psychotherapy is
a rehabilitation cost that courts would treat as an aspect of general damages rather than as
medical expenses. See Avraham, supra note 39, at 965, 969 n.75; cf Pryor, supra note 20, at
664-65 & n.20, 676-78 (noting that medical expenses can include rehabilitation costs);
Viscusi, supra note 32, at 151-52 (calling this view a misapprehension).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 4 illus. 3; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455; Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation,
Liability of One Causing Physical Injuries As a Result of Which Injured Party Attempts or Commits
Suicide, 77 A.L.R.3d 311 (1977 & Supp. 2007).
118. Cf Abel, supra note 37, at 267 (noting facetiously that "a defense lawyer could cal-
lously answer that the living can always mitigate damages-by suicide"); infra note 155
(discussing drug-induced coma and terminal sedation). Recently, one of my Torts students
asked whether a plaintiff who had suffered a catastrophic leg injury certain to cause her
continuing agony should have to mitigate by amputation.
119. Separately, most courts predicate an award for nonpecuniary damages on some
consciousness by the victim. See, e.g., Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 775 N.E.2d
725, 737-39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), modified on other grounds, 786 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Mass.
2003); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. 1989); see also Capelouto v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (holding that infants can recover for pain and
suffering); Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911, 925-34 (Miss. 2002) (Cobb,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying numerous jurisdictions that de-
cline to award damages for past pain and suffering if the victim has died before judgment);
cf. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 304, 312 (1992) (rejecting argument that loss-of-
enjoyment claim brought on behalf of comatose patient amounted to a request for punitive
damages barred by FTCA). Although sometimes criticized, and physicians may struggle to
define varying degrees of awareness, see Rob Stein, "Vegetative" Woman's Brain Shows Surprising
Activity: Tests Indicate Awareness, Imagination, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2006, at Al, such a re-
quirement makes perfect sense if linked to the notion that the award makes resources
available for the treatment of that emotional harm.
120. See Sugarman, supra note 36, at 422 n.21; Neil Vidmar et al.,Jury Awards for Medical
Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 265, 296 (1998).
[VOL. 42:2
Pain-and-Suffering Damages
than ten percent of overall medical expenditures. 12' Although the
latter figure fails to count non-psychiatric measures designed to
alleviate pain and suffering, 122 and undoubtedly also reflects a long-
standing problem of undertreatment,123 no one thinks that the
health care system should devote well over half of its available re-
sources to addressing these problems. Yet the pattern of awards from
tort litigation would have one believe that the emotional sequelae of
accidental injuries dwarf the costs associated with efforts under-
taken to correct the associated physical harms.
Awards for pain and suffering in cases involving unintentional
124torts date at least as far back as the early nineteenth century, pre-dating basic advances in analgesia such as the synthesis of aspirin
121. See Tami L. Mark et al., Mental Health Treatment Expenditure Trends, 1986-2003, 58
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1041, 1042 (2007) (finding that "mental health expenditures fell from
8% of all health expenditures in 1986 to 6% of all health expenditures in 2003"); see also
Benjamin C. Druss, Rising Mental Health Costs: What Are We Getting for Our Money?, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 614 (2006).
122. Patterns of prescription drug usage, which accounts for approximately 10% of
overall health care spending, may offer a better perspective. In 2007, physicians issued more
prescriptions for antidepressants than for any other therapeutic class of drugs, with narcotic
analgesics ranked third and benzodiazepines (anti-anxiety agents) ranked tenth overall, but
combining the raw numbers for these three classes accounted for only 13 percent of all
prescriptions issued. See IMS National Prescription Audit, 2007 Top Therapeutic Classes by
U.S. Dispensed Prescriptions, http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/
Content/Document/Top-Line %20Industry%2Data/2007%2Top%2OTherapeutic%20Classes
%20by%20RXs.pdf; see also id., 2007 Top Therapeutic Classes by U.S. Sales, http://
www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/Document/Top-Line%20
Industry%2OData/2007%2OTop%2OTherapeutic%20Classes%20by%2OSales.pdf (finding that
antidepressants ranked fourth in sales, behind statins and proton pump inhibitors, while
narcotic analgesics and benzodiazepines did not even crack the top ten, presumably because
of the widespread availability of cheaper generic versions). These figures, of course, offer
only a crude means of comparison: some of these prescriptions may have absolutely nothing
to do with efforts to treat pain and suffering (e.g., abuse and diversion of opioids);
conversely, physicians occasionally may prescribe drugs from other therapeutic classes (e.g.,
anticonvulsants and antipsychotics) in order to treat pain and suffering.
123. See C. Stratton Hill, Jr., Editorial, When Will Adequate Pain Treatment Be the Norm?,
274JAMA 1881 (1995); Kenneth B. Wells &Jeanne Miranda, Editorial, Reducing the Burden of
Depression, 298 JAMA 1451 (2007); Ronald Melzack, The Tragedy of Needless Pain, Sci. Am.,
Feb. 1990, at 27-28, 33; Kathleen Fackelmann, New Standard Calls for "Whole" Cancer Care;
Patients Also Need Social Services, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2007, at 7D (reporting that the Institute
of Medicine has issued recommendations "callling] for a new standard of care in which all
oncologists routinely screen patients for mental distress"). But see Shankar Vedantam, Criteria
for Depression Are Too Broad, Researchers Say: Guidelines May Encompass Many Who Are Just Sad,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2007, at A2 (noting concerns about the overprescribing of antidepres-
sants).
124. See Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 551-52 (Kan. 1990);Jeffrey
O'Connell & Rita James Simon, Payments for Pain & Suffering. Who Wants What, When &
Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1 app. at 83, 93-99. From the beginning, courts declined to draw any
distinction between the pain associated with an injury and accompanying suffering. See Fan-
tozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 484-85 (Ohio 1992) (citing decisions
dating as far back as 1872).
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and the development of surgical anesthesia. 25Treatments for pain
have, of course, become increasingly sophisticated since then.
2
1
Patients now enjoy access to a new generation of opioid analge-
sics, 1 v more refined delivery methods such as infusion pumps, 2
nerve blocking agents,129 various non-narcotic drugs,'3° devices for
stimulating nerves,' and a range of other techniques.1 2 More gen-
125. See David B. Jack, One Hundred Years of Aspirin, 350 LANCET 437, 438 (1997); Martin
S. Pernick, The Calculus of Suffering in Nineteenth-Century Surgery, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Apr.
1983, at 26, 28.
126. See PATRICK WALL, PAIN: THE SCIENCE OF SUFFERING 109-20 (2000). See generally
HANDBOOK OF PAIN MANAGEMENT (Ronald Melzack & Patrick D. Wall eds., 2003). In addi-
tion, methods of verifying and measuring pain Continue to improve. SeeAdamJ. Kolber, Pain
Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 432, 434 (2007)
("[D]espite many conceptual and technological challenges, neuroimaging may someday
play a critical role in the evaluation of pain claims."); see also Erika Kinetz, Is Hysteria Real?
Brain Images Say Yes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at Fl.
127. See David E. Joranson et al., Trends in Medical Use and Abuse of Opioid Analgesics, 283
JAMA 1710, 1710 (2000) (explaining that "the use of opioids in the class of morphine is the
cornerstone of pain management"); Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain
Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 58 & n.53, 61-62 (2003). If laypersons
share the "opiophobia" that inhibits aggressive pain management by physicians, seeJosephJ.
Fins, Public Attitudes About Pain and Analgesics: Clinical Implications, 13 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM
MGMT. 169, 171 (1997), then judges and jurors may not find any fault in victims' failure to
make use of such drugs.
128. See Mona Momeni et al., Patient-Controlled Analgesia in the Management of Postoperative
Pain, 66 DRUGS 2321 (2006); Patricia C. Crowley, Comment, No Pain, No Gain? The Agency for
Health Care Policy & Research's Attempt to Change Inefficient Health Care Practice of Withholding
Medication from Patients in Pain, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 383, 395 (1994) (describ-
ing federal guidelines that call for preventative rather than "as needed" administration of
drugs to treat post-operative pain); id. at 391 n.59, 392-93 n.69 (discussing the advantages of
patient-controlled analgesia).
129. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Pain Management and Palliative Care in the Era of Managed
Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267, 268 (1998) (adding that these
treatments can cost many thousands of dollars).
130. These might include muscle relaxants (e.g., Soma) and anticonvulsants (e.g.,
Neurontino). See Roger Chou et al., Comparative Efficacy and Safety of Skeletal Muscle Relaxants
for Spasticity and Musculoskeletal Conditions: A Systematic Review, 28J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT.
140, 141 (2004); Morris Maizels & Bill McCarberg, Antidepressants and Antiepileptic Drugs for
Chronic Non-Cancer Pain, 71 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 483 (2005). In addition, consumers can
purchase an increasing number of analgesics without a prescription. See Lars Noah, Treat
Yourself" Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American Health Care?, 19 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 359, 369-71 & n.68 (2006).
131. See El-sayed A. Ghoname et al., Percutaneous Electrical Nerve Stimulation for Low Back
Pain: A Randomized Crossover Study, 281 JAMA 818 (1999); Tara Parker-Pope, Pain Relief for
Some, with an Odd Tradeoff N.Y TIMES,Jan. 8, 2008, at F6 (spinal cord stimulation).
132. See Hoffmann, supra note 129, at 277-81, 288 n.94. These include behavioral ther-
apy, strength training, dietary changes, and acupuncture. See, e.g., Michael Haake et al.,
German Acupuncture Trials (GERAC) for Chronic Low Back Pain, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1892, 1896-98 (2007);Jeremy Laurance, Are We Really Born to Suffer?, TIMES (LoNDON),Jan.
27, 1997, at 18. Even if unconventional treatments do not work in the manner promised,
they may unleash a powerful placebo effect. See Kathleen M. Boozang, The Therapeutic Pla-
cebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REv. 687, 718 (2002) ("[T]hose with the most to
gain are patients whose pain remains unresolved by conventional treatment methods."); id.
at 691 (observing that "many physicians believe that alternative practitioners are particularly
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erally, with the growing recognition of the importance of treating
pain, 3 health care providers have begun to embrace the need for
a multidisciplinary approach to analgesia.
3 4
Treatments for suffering also have become increasingly sophisti-
cated in recent years. Among antidepressants, we have moved over
the course of the last half century from tricyclics (e.g., Elavil®
(amitriptyline)) and tetracyclics (e.g., Desyrel® (trazadone)), and
then the monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors (e.g., Parnate®
(tranylcypromine)), to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs) such as Prozac® (fluoxetine) .15 Although the widespread
use of the newest generation of antidepressants has attracted criti-
cism, 3 6 they represent an unmistakable advance over the older
pharmacological options.
For the treatment of anxiety (and associated insomnia), patients
need no longer rely on the old and sometimes troublesome stand-
bys such as benzodiazepines (including Valium®, Halcion®, and
Xanax®) now that they can try SSRIs and the newer sleep
aids (Ambien®, Lunesta®, and Rozerem®). In addition, various
effective at evoking the placebo response"); id. at 711 ("Changing people's expectations
regarding pain, depression or anxiety can change their experiences .... "); id. at 713
(" [S] timulation of endorphins may be instrumental in achieving placebo analgesic effect as
well as reduction in depression ... ).
133. See Debra B. Gordon et al., American Pain Society Recommendations for Improving the
Quality of Acute and Cancer Pain Management, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1574 (2005);
Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What Can Medi-
cal Boards Do?, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 333-41 (1998).
134. See Marcia L. Meldrum, A Capsule History of Pain Management, 290 JAMA 2470,
2473-74 (2003); Carmichael, supra note 17, at 46-47.
135. SeeJeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Drugs of the Psychopharmacological Revolution in Clini-
cal Psychiatry, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1254, 1256-57 (2000); J. John Mann, The Medical
Management of Depression, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1819, 1821-25 (2005); Erica Goode, Antide-
pressants Lift Clouds, but Lose "Miracle Drug" Labe4 N.Y. TIMEs,June 30, 2002, § 1, at 1.
136. See, e.g., David Brent, Editorial, Antidepressants and Suicidal Behavior: Cause or Cure?,
164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 989 (2007); Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant
Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008); Gardiner Har-
ris, Debate Resumes on the Safety of Depression's Wonder Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at Al;
Shankar Vedantam, Youth Suicides Increased As Antidepressant Use Fell WASH. POST, Sept. 6,
2007, at Al. Insofar as they work for only some patients, psychotropic drugs are no different
from pharmaceutical treatments for other medical conditions. See Lars Noah, The Coming
Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients' Genetic Profiles, 43 JURMETRICS J. 1,
2, 4-7 (2002); see also Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARiz. L. REV. 373, 383-85, 387-88, 393-94, 422 &
n.211, 428 & n.240, 447-49 (2002) (discussing the ineffectiveness of other medical interven-
tions).
137. See Gregory Fricchione, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 351 NEW ENG.J. MED. 675,676-
79 (2004); Michael H. Silber, Chronic Insomnia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 803, 805-08 (2005); see
also Robert L. DuPont & Caroline M. DuPont, The Treatment of Anxiety: Realistic Expectations
and Risks Posed By Controlled Substances, 22J.L. MED. & ETHICS 206, 207, 209-10 (1994) (ben-
zodiazepines); Stephanie Saul, Sleep Drugs Found Only Mildly Effective, but Wildly Popular, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at F4.
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non-pharmaceutical mental health interventions may offer relief.
138
Next on the horizon, patients with depression that fail to respond
to SSRIs or psychotherapy may benefit from the implantable vagus
nerve stimulator,' 39 and PTSD sufferers some day might undergo
"memory dampening" treatments. 140
The undertreatment of pain potentially exposes health care pro-
fessionals to tort liability. 4' Similarly, reliance on psychotherapy
alone and the failure to offer antidepressant medications may
provide the basis for negligence claims against mental health institu-
tions.42 In short, reasonable health care providers must offer their
patients available mechanisms for minimizing pain and suffering.
138. SeeJonathan R.T. Davidson, Recognition and reatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,
286JAMA 584, 585-86 (2001); Hickling et al., supra note 28, at 620-21, 632-33 (explaining
that cognitive behavioral interventions outperformed supportive psychotherapy in treating
PTSD in victims of motor vehicle accidents, but adding that neither approach entirely cures
a patient); Benedict Carey, For Psychotherapy's Claims, Skeptics Demand Proof N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2004, at F1; Shankar Vedantam, Most PTSD Treatments Not Proven Effective: Scientists Find
That One Therapy Is Shown to Help Disorder; Evidence of Drugs' Benefits Inconclusive, WASH. POST,
Oct. 19, 2007, at A3. Talk therapies are not, however, always benign. See Sharon Begley, Get
Shrunk at Your Own Risk, NEWSWEEK, June 18, 2007, at 49 (discussing research that found
negative outcomes in grief counseling and "stress debriefing" for PTSD patients, adding that
experts "estimate that 10 to 20 percent of people who receive psychotherapy are harmed by
it").
139. See Miriam Shuchman, Approving the Vagus-Nerve Stimulator for Depression, 356 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1604 (2007) (reporting, however, that doubts about its efficacy persist); see also
Shankar Vedantam, Magnetic Relief for Depression?, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at Fl (report-
ing that the FDAjust approved a transcranial magnetic stimulation device). In addition, the
Internet may offer powerful social outlets for the disabled. See Rob Stein, Real Hope in a Vir-
tual World: Online Identities Leave Limitations Behind, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2007, at Al.
140. See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1561, 1574-77 (2006); Peter Gorner, Drug Eases Pain of Bad
Memories, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 3, 2006, at Al; Rob Stein, Is Every Memory Worth Keeping? Contro-
versy over Pills to Reduce Mental Trauma, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2004, at Al (describing
experiments using the hypertension drug propranolol, which appears to block the action of
stress hormones on the amygdala and thereby blunt the etching or reconsolidation of pain-
ful memories); Rick Weiss, On Ecstasy, Consesus Is Elusive, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2002, atA7
(reporting about research into MDMA's possible efficacy as a treatment for PTSD); see also
Rick Weiss, "Ecstasy" Use Studied to Ease Fear in Terminally Ill, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004, at
All ("MDMA[] has been referred to by psychiatrists as an 'empathogen,' a drug especially
good at putting people in touch with their emotions. Some believe it [as well as another
psychedelic drug, psilocybin] could help patients come to terms with the biggest emotional
challenge of all: the end of life.").
141. See, e.g., Gaddis v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 709, 717 (D.S.C. 1997); see also Barry
R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 28
(2001); Rima J. Oken, Note, Curing Healthcare Providers' Failure to Administer Opioids in the
Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1977-81 (2002).
142. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. Presbyterian Hosp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (App. Div. 1995);
see also Gerald L. Kerman, The Psychiatric Patient's Right to Effective Treatment: Implications of
Osheroffv. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 409 (1990) (discussing the settlement of
a high-profile malpractice claim); cf. Gowan v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 1297, 1300-01 (D.
Or. 1985) (finding no merit to such allegations of psychiatric malpractice); Paddock v.
Chacko, 522 So. 2d 410, 417-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same).
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Although regard for personal autonomy means that patients gener-
ally remain free to decline such interventions, it hardly follows that
other tortfeasors must pay for the full (untreated) consequences of
their negligence when victims unreasonably decline options for re-
lieving some of their pain and suffering.
D. Making the Case for Mitigation
The academic literature reveals almost no discussion of the psy-
chiatric mitigation issue. 4 3 A pair of recently published pieces
address the question, though primarily in connection with negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims as opposed to pain-and-
suffering damages more generally, 144 and, while they arrived at
divergent conclusions about the desirability of applying the avoid-
able consequences rule in this context, neither article offered a
terribly convincing argument. A student piece published in 2001
recognized that a mitigation requirement might help to reduce the
moral hazard created in tort litigation when a victim realizes that any
effort he or she takes to minimize the severity of the injury will inure
to the benefit of the tortfeasor by reducing the ultimate award,
1 45
143. See Eugene Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of Emotional Distress Damages, 68
U. Cut. L. REv. 491, 500-01 (2001) ("Despite the ubiquitous use of mitigation in determin-
ing damages, courts have neglected to apply the rule to emotional distress....
Commentators appear to have wholly ignored the issue."); see also McCaffery et al., supra
note 53, at 1403 ("There has been little research about the meaning or measurement of
non-pecuniary damages, although such damages play a central role in our practical tort
system, which in turn plays a central role in the regulation of all activities in our society.").
144. See Kevin C. Klein & G. Nicole Hininger, Mitigation of Psychological Damages: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to Emotional Distress
Injuries, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 405 (2004); Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 491. An ear-
lier article, which focused on Social Security disability insurance and workers' compensation
programs, included a brief discussion of the mitigation rule's likely application in chronic
pain cases. See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 239, 286-88 (1991) (doubting that it would have much consequence given
the ineffectiveness of then-available treatments for such patients, and contrasting these cases
with the use of the rule to evaluate choices about conventional medical care for physical
illness and injury).
145. See Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 491 ("[I]f psychiatric treatment might reduce
or eliminate a plaintiffs emotional distress, the plaintiff might nonetheless forgo such
treatment if he knows that the defendant will be liable for the full, unmitigated level of dis-
tress."); id. at 507 ("The de facto exemption of emotional distress from the mitigation rule
creates moral hazard, resulting in systematic overcompensation of plaintiffs. Applying the
mitigation rule would, ideally, be the first response to this problem."). Mr. (now Professor)
Kontorovich added that the problem might become even greater when courts require proof
of "severe" distress, see id. at 491, but this incorrectly assumes that such a threshold showing
relates to the seriousness of the emotional harm at the time of trial, and it directly contradicts
his later argument that uninjured plaintiffs could commit fraud by pointing to their use of
antidepressants to confirm their alleged distress, see id. at 511 (suggesting that "plaintiffs might
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but the author concluded that it would make more sense for courts
to restrict the availability of emotional distress claims altogether
(for instance, by resurrecting the actual impact and physical mani-
festation requirements that courts previously had used to ensure
the genuineness of the plaintiffs alleged distress).46
Mr. Kontorovich argued that a psychiatric mitigation require-
ment would pose special difficulties, which "may explain why
courts have avoided the issue.' ' 147 First, he correctly dismissed the
idea that plaintiffs would have to use their "willpower" to manage a
traumatic experience (in effect, to "tough it out"). 14 Although
some victims will show more resilience than others, and the extent
to which any one plaintiff has successfully coped with a traumatic
experience presumably would result in a reduced damage award,
courts should not penalize victims who fail to cope as well as others
might under similar circumstances. Even so, research suggests (and
courts should recognize) that individuals who suffer serious inju-
ries do not invariably report dramatic reductions in their well-
being.149 (This research also finds that lottery winners do not enjoy
assert emotional distress damages and claim to fully 'mitigate' nonexistent distress by taking
the antidepressants they would want to take anyway").
146. See id. at 518-20; id. at 492 ("[T]he best way for courts to control moral hazard
would be to return to the recently disfavored approach of allowing recovery only in catego-
ries of cases where objectively verifiable circumstances, such as a crippling wound, allow
courts to infer severe emotional distress with a high degree of confidence."). There may, of
course, be other legitimate grounds for criticizing the uneven expansion of doctrine in this
area, including the impact, zone of danger, and foreseeable bystander categories. See, e.g.,
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 545-49, 557 (1994); Camper v. Minor, 915
S.W.2d 437, 440-46 (Tenn. 1996); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized
Torts, 88 VA. L. Rav. 1625, 1668-71 (2002). Kontorovich failed to explain, however, why the
moral hazard concern (in this particular context) justifies foregoing the benefits that others
have found in recognizing at least some of these types of claims. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 46-47; supra Part lI.B. His
solution also does nothing to combat the problem when distress (pain and suffering) dam-
ages arise in connection with a tortiously caused physical injury, though he did recognize
the weaknesses associated with common responses to such awards (e.g., statutory caps). See
Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 515-18.
147. Kontorovich, supa note 143, at 507.
148. See id. at 512-13 (arguing that such a requirement would be nearly impossible to
apply); cf. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 146, at 1681-88 (explaining that this general
notion underlies doctrinal limitations on emotional distress claims); id. at 1683 ("IT]he
default rule against recovery for emotional harm reflects a judgment that the maintenance
of one's emotional well-being in the face of adversity is something for which a plaintiff ordi-
narily must take responsibility.").
149. See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745, 749-50, 760-69 (2007); Paul Menzel et al., The Role of
Adaptation to Disability and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Normative Analysis, 55
Soc. SCI. & MED. 2149 (2002); Pryor, supra note 11, at 114 ("The narrative, sociological, and
psychological literature of disability makes clear that loss often forces reexamination, recon-
ceptualization, and the alteration of values, attitudes, beliefs, and desires."); id. at 116
("[T]he transformative potential of disability has at least this implication: even a fully in-
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lasting improvements in well-being,5 which suggests that large
noneconomic damage awards may do little to offset a plaintiffs
pain and suffering.' 5I)
Second, Kontorovich suggested that demanding mitigation of
emotional distress would pose a greater threat to personal auton-
omy, 52 but the mitigation rule only requires that victims accept
reasonable treatments, and the autonomy concerns seem no
greater in this context than in connection with pharmaceutical or
surgical interventions for any number of physical injuries."' He
formed, nondevaluative pre-injury judgment is a questionable basis for conclusions about
the nature and quality of postinjury life .... ); Shankar Vedantam, Is Great Happiness Too
Much of a Good Thing?, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2007, at A9; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness
to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REV. 303, 327-28 (2007) (warning that "duration" or
"projection bias" may lead juries to assume continuing pain and suffering even though the
"psychological immune system" ensures that victims will adapt to physical injuries after a
short time and without being dramatically worse off than before); Childhood Traumas Rarely
Trigger Disorder, WASH. POST, May 8, 2007, at Al1 (noting that a study found "emotional resil-
iency in children"); cf Adler, supra note 64, at 997 ("[M]any people are dispositionaly
anxious; they tend to find something or other to be anxious about, and their overall level of
anxiety remains pretty much the same, with different objects rationalizing an ongoing anxi-
ety state.").
150. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 149, at 761;Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and
the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 167 (2005); see also Shankar
Vedantam, C'mon, Get Happy? It's Easier Said Than Done, WASH. POST,Jan. 7, 2008, at Al0.
151. Cf O'Connell & Simon, supra note 124, at 19-22, 26-28 (finding that most acci-
dent victims did not understand their entitlement to recover for pain and suffering, in many
cases even after they already had received an award that included this item of damages); id.
at 48 ("[O]n the basis of our findings, it would appear that auto accident victims do not feel
'a sense of continuing outrage,' nor do damages for pain and suffering 'wipe out' any sense
of outrage.").
152. See Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 509-10 ("Psychiatric mitigation also differs
from other medical mitigation because the side effects express themselves in the mind and
mood of the patient, and thus can be seen as greater usurpations of autonomy."). In support
of the proposition that antidepressants might result in profound alterations in a person's
mind or emotional state, he cited a popular press book published eight years earlier that
had assailed the growing use of SSRIs. See id. at 509 n.91 (citing PETER D. KRAMER, LISTEN-
ING TO PROZAC (1993)); see also id. at 510 (drawing a parallel to electroshock treatments).
Critics of SSRIs surely exaggerate for the sake of emphasis when they suggest that these
drugs amount to a "chemical lobotomy." See JOSEPH GLENMULLEN, PROZAC BACKLASH:
OVERCOMING THE DANGERS OF PROZAC, ZOLoFT, PAXIL, AND OTHER ANTIDEPRESSANTS
WITH SAFE, EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES 8 (2000). As discussed previously, the latest medical
research offers a generally favorable account of the relative risks and benefits of currently
available psychotropic drugs. See supra Part IlI.C; see also supra note 82 (referencing current
medical views about electroconvulsive therapy).
153. For example, widely accepted treatments for cardiovascular problems, diabetes,
epilepsy, organ failure, and even orthopedic injuries carry risks of adversely affecting a pa-
tient's personality or cognitive abilities. See, e.g., Bernadette Tansey, Doctors Warned of Drugs'
Danger: Anti-Epilepsy Medications Tied to Risk of Suicide, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 2008, at C1. Kon-
torovich pointed out that courts resolving "wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful birth" cases
(though he incorrectly characterizes these as "wrongful life" claims) generally do not de-
mand abortion or adoption as forms of mitigation. See Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 509 &
n.89; see also Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedi-
cal Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REv. 603, 639, 643 & n.168 (2003) (discussing these issues).
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recognized that drugs used in connection with surgery might have
similar modes of action (presumably an allusion to anesthetic
agents), but he argued that long-term use of antidepressants would
"have more durable and pronounced effects on the personality."'54
In emphasizing that their mode of action alters brain chemistry,'5
however, Kontorovich misses the point. Unlike symptomatic treat-
ments that might help to dull or mask an emotional injury, which
itself bespeaks some undesirable alteration of the victim's original
brain chemistry allegedly triggered by the defendant's tortious act,
SSRIs and other psychotropic drugs aim (in theory at least) to reset
to normal the neurotransmitter channels damaged by a traumatic
event. 5"The fact that psychoactive drugs have become more effec-
Deciding to try an antidepressant hardly seems to present an individual with an equally
profound choice. In addition, some courts have applied the avoidable consequences rule to
some fairly dramatic lifestyle changes recommended by a treating physician (some of which
the use of SSRIs may facilitate). See, e.g., Gideon v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129,
1138-39 (5th Cir. 1985) (smoking cessation); Tanberg v. Ackerman Inv. Co., 473 N.w.2d
193, 196 (Iowa 1991) (weight loss).
154. Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 510 n.94 ("[P]sychiatric mitigation would have a
far greater effect on a plaintiff's mental state. Unlike drugs administered in surgery, whose
effects on personality are incidental, antidepressants and their ilk are taken over a long
period of time .... ).
155. See id. ("Indeed, unlike other medications that can affect mood, Prozac and similar
drugs are specifically designed to change the patient's brain chemistry so as to cause sub-
stantial changes in his consciousness and day-to-day personality."). Another student author
went even further when he wondered (in passing) whether a seriously injured victim would
have to mitigate severe pain and suffering by undergoing what amounts to a drug-induced
coma. See DanielJ. Gabler, Comment, Conscious Pain and SufferingIs Not a Matter of Degree, 74
MARQ. L. REV. 289, 312 n.154 (1991); see also id. at 319-20 (arguing that, even though the
unconscious victim then would lose the right to recover any further damages for pain and
suffering, courts should award loss-of-enjoyment-of-life damages for this interval of time).
Such mitigation would not, of course, be expected if regarded as unreasonable, and physi-
cians typically use barbiturates to induce coma only in cases of traumatic brain injury or
prolonged seizures. If, however, the victim's injuries meant imminent death, physicians may
offer "terminal sedation" even though it might hasten death. See Bernard Lo & Gordon
Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying Patients, 294JAMA 1810, 1812-15 (2005); Gina Castel-
lano, Note, The Criminalization of TreatingEnd of Life Patients with Risky Pain Medication and the
Role of the Extreme Emergency Situation, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 203, 211-12 (2007); see also Sidney
H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320
NEw ENC.J. MED. 844, 847 (1989) ("The proper dose of pain medication is the dose that is
sufficient to relieve pain and suffering, even to the point of unconsciousness.").
156. See Richard A. Friedman, Like Drugs, Talk Therapy Can Change Brain Chemistry, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at F5. Chronic pain also disrupts normal brain chemistry, which suggests
that successful treatments may have a similar mechanism of action. See John D. Loeser &
Ronald Melzack, Pain: An Overview, 353 LANCET 1607, 1609 (1999); Melanie Thernstrom, Pain,
the Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 66. In addition, to the extent that ill-
nesses (e.g., brain tumors) adversely affect behavior, effective non-pharmacological
interventions would achieve a similar (and desirable) alteration in personality. Cf Kolber, supra
note 140, at 1604 ("It is, thus, not at all clear why we ought to revere the selective rewriting of
our lives that we do without pharmaceuticals, yet be so skeptical of pharmaceutically-assisted
rewriting."). Lastly, drugs used chronically in order to treat non-psychiatric conditions also may
have lasting (and perhaps tmndesirable) impacts on personality. See Gardiner Harris, FD.A.
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tive in their mechanism of action argues in favor of rather than
against application of the avoidable consequences doctrine.
Third, Kontorovich speculated that a psychiatric mitigation rule
might create a "second-order" moral hazard insofar as plaintiffs
would tend to overuse antidepressants.' Let me try to make his
point more forcefully: a psychiatric mitigation rule might encour-
age the recreational use of powerful narcotics by tort victims
alleging severe pain. In neither case, however, would it increase
whatever risk of such behavior already exists: even without a miti-
gation rule, plaintiffs could use such drugs in the hopes of proving
a dubious emotional distress or pain-and-suffering claim (and hav-
ing the defendant pay the costs of this course of drug treatment),.
Moreover, to the extent that it attempts to monetize future pain
and suffering, the avoidable consequences doctrine would look to
expert testimony about treatment and prognosis rather than past
patterns of (over)use.
Fourth, Kontorovich worried that a psychiatric mitigation rule
would threaten patient confidentiality"9 but this makes little sense:
the plaintiff already has decided to put his or her mental state into
Requiring Suicide Studies in Drug Trials, N.Y. TiMES,Jan. 24, 2008, at Al ("Medicines to treat acne,
hypertension, high cholesterol, swelling, heartburn, pain, bacterial infections and insomnia
can all cause psychiatric problems ... ."); Shankar Vedantam, Prescription for an Obsession? Gam-
bling Sex Manias Called Surprise Risks of Parkinson's Drugs, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2006, at Al
(reporting that dopamine agonists (e.g., Mirapexo and Requip) may turn some patients into
obsessive pleasure seekers).
157. See Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 510-11 (calling this the "problem of the merry
mitigator"). He referred to "cosmetic" uses of antidepressants, suggesting both recreational
(enhanced "sense of well-being") and frivolous uses (e.g., treating premenstrual syndrome),
see id. at 510-11 n.99; see also Colleen Cebuliak, Life As a Blonde: The Use of Prozac in the '90s,
33 ALTA. L. REV. 611, 612-13, 619-25 (1995), but he failed to recognize that similar prob-
lems might arise with so-called "lifestyle" (though non-psychoactive) drugs or cosmetic surgical
procedures used in connection with alleged efforts to mitigate a physical injury. Moreover,
insofar as he conceded that psychotropic agents may have non-psychiatric applications, it cuts
against his earlier argument because victims with physical injuries that trigger secondary effects
treatable by such drugs (e.g., discomfort causing an inability to sleep) would be expected to
use them unless a court decided that a reasonable patient might decline to do so given the
risks of side effects (whether physical or cognitive). In short, the mitigation rule (with its rea-
sonableness inquiry) should focus on the nature of the intervention rather than the nature of
the injury subject to treatment. Perhaps, given current knowledge about existing psychotropic
agents, courts would conclude as a matter of law (as they have in the case of abortion, see
supra note 153) that mitigation never requires the use of such drugs (or, more plausibly, a
subset of such drugs), whether for treating a physical or emotional injury.
158. See supra note 30. Some commentators had made similar (and equally unpersua-
sive) arguments to justify less generous insurance coverage for mental health treatments. See
Lawrence R. Landerman et al., The Relationship Between Insurance Coverage and Psychiatric
Disorder in Predicting Use of Mental Health Services, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1785, 1789 (1994)
(finding little foundation for such concerns).
159. SeeKontorovich, supra note 143, at 512.
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issue, ' 6° any additional stigma associated with the use of psychiatricS 161
medications seems minor, and, at least as applied to limit future
emotional harms (and to estimate future medical expenses), the
mitigation rule would not require that the plaintiff actually make
use of (much less reveal to the public) any embarrassing treat-
ments.162 In short, after initially deciding that a psychiatric
mitigation rule might have some merit, the author offered entirely
unpersuasive arguments for dismissing the idea and preferring in-
stead his more radical solution of resurrecting some decidedly old-
fashioned (and generally discredited) doctrinal limitations on neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
1 63
An article published in 2004 by a pair of newly minted lawyers
advocated extending the mitigation rule to emotional harms.'6
Apart from arguably overstating the degree of judicial hostility to
the idea, their article suffers from a number of limitations that de-
tract from its central thesis. The authors purported to offer an
economic analysis that demonstrated the desirability of applying
160. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006) ("If a plaintiff by seek-
ing damages for emotional distress places his or her psychological state in issue, the
defendant is entitled to discover any records of that state."); Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38,
48-49, 51 (Mont. 2004); Kenneth S. Broun, The Medical Privilege in the Federal Courts: Should It
Matter Whether YourEgo or YourElbow Hurts?, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 657, 670-75 (2004); Ellen E.
McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow Waiver of the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege AfterJaffee v. Redmond, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1369, 1375-90 (2001) (criticizing
the majority approach).
161. See Anne Hudson Jones, Mental Illness Made Public: Ending the Stigma?, 352 LANCET
1060 (1998). Or at least no worse than the stigma one might associate with other widely used
medications that a plaintiff might take in order to mitigate a physical condition (e.g., erec-
tile dysfunction drugs). In addition, the use of pain medications and sleep aids would not
carry even the residual stigma allegedly associated with psychotropics. In any event, this
argument conflicts with Kontorovich's prior argument that plaintiffs without genuine emo-
tional distress might inappropriately make (and prove) use of antidepressants.
162. In fact, the victim may have less fear of embarrassing disclosure than when relying
on employer-provided first-party insurance to cover such interventions. Cf Theo Francis,
Medical Dilemma: Spread of Records Stirs Patient Fears of Privacy Erosion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26,
2006, at Al; Brian Krebs, Extortion Used in Prescription Data Breach: FBI Investigating Threat
Against Express Scripts Customers, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2008, at DI; Ellen Nakashima, Prescrip-
tion Data Used to Access Consumers: Records Aid Insurers but Prompt Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 2008, at Al; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Plans'Access to Pharmacy Data Raises Privacy Issues:
Benefit Firms Delve into Patient Records, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at Al.
163. Kontorovich presumably would applaud a decision such as Fournell v. Usher Pest
Control Co., 305 N.W.2d 605, 606-07 (Neb. 1981), which summarily denied an emotional
distress claim for the lack of any physical manifestation notwithstanding the fact that a psy-
chiatrist had treated the victim for depression over an extended period of time (and had
even hospitalized her three times). Nebraska subsequently liberalized its rules. See Hamilton
v. Nestor, 659 N.W2d 321, 325-29 (Neb. 2003).
164. See Klein & Hininger, supra note 144, at 431 ("Due to the fact that the common law
is increasingly willing to recognize psychological damages, courts should impose an affirma-
tive duty to take reasonable steps to minimize psychological injuries.").
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the duty to mitigate in these cases, 65 but their admittedly oversim-
plified comparison between persons who make prompt use of
antidepressants and those who refuse treatment failed to take into
account the drug expenditures avoided by the latter group or the
possibility that the expenditures incurred by the former group
might fail to speed recovery.1
6 6
The authors also offered several unconvincing hypotheses to ex-
plain the common law's differential treatment of physical and
psychological harms in applying the avoidable consequences doc-
trine, including the relative recency of the recognition of
emotional distress claims,'67 and the tactical choices of defense
counsel,' 6s while completely ignoring the more likely explanation
based on recent changes in the external environment (i.e., im-
proved interventions, enhanced insurance coverage for mental
health services, and reduced stigma) .169 Lastly, by focusing narrowly
on claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent
165. See id. at 433-38.
166. In contrast, in an earlier hypothetical, the authors imagined an emotional injury
valued at $50,000, which the victim could cut in half by undergoing treatment costing
$5,000. See id. at 431-32. Although such a course of action would seem to make perfect sense
from the perspective of the sufferer, it hardly follows that (as the authors blithely assume)
these also represent "societal costs" (of $50,000 or $25,000) and that the treatment (which
clearly does entail a societal cost of $5,000) represents the efficient outcome ($5,000 +
$25,000 < $50,000). As critics of pain-and-suffering awards have argued, see supra note 39,
noneconomic damages lack any real meaning in the marketplace.
167. See Klein & Hininger, supra note 144, at 425 (placing the date in the 1980s). Apart
from entirely ignoring the long history of awarding damages for pain and suffering that
accompany a physical injury, this misdates the recognition of emotional distress claims by
several decades. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 547 nn.6 & 8, 554-55
(1994); Levit, supra note 3, at 141-46; id. at 144 ("By the middle of the twentieth century,
there was a substantial reversal of the general proposition of the previous century regarding
compensation for emotional pain alone."). The authors also suggested that courts routinely
demand a diagnosis of emotional distress. See Klein & Hininger, supra note 144, at 413-14,
426; see also supra notes 27-28. In fact, a number of jurisdictions require no such medical
evidence to corroborate claims of noneconomic injury. See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d
196, 205 (Alaska 1995); Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1283,
1286 n.9 (Me. 1987).
168. See Klein & Hininger, supra note 144, at 425. In fact, a failure-to-mitigate argument
would help to reinforce (rather than undermine) a defendant's preferred contention deny-
ing that the plaintiff suffered any emotional injury, as the authors belatedly recognized. See
id. at 429 ("If a plaintiff does not seek psychological treatment, it stands to reason that he or
she has not suffered psychological harm.").
169. Instead, the authors expressed a decidedly ahistoric confidence in psychopharma-
cology and easy access through managed care plans. Contrast id. at 415-16, 426, 430, with
Donald P. Hay & Linda K. Hay, Diagnosing and Treating Depression in a Managed Care World, 42
ST. Louis U. L.J. 55, 56 (1998) ("Up until recently, the only antidepressant medications that
were available to treat depression had significant medical side effects . . . ."); id. at 57 ("Of-
ten a closed [drug] formulary does not include the new and improved alternatives as they
are generally more expensive."). In fact, some of the earlier decisions rejecting a duty to
mitigate psychological harm (but not cited by the authors) arose during the era of electro-
shock therapy. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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physical injury (and the use of antidepressants), the authors failed
to consider the broader consequences of their proposed mitigation
requirement, including the possibility that such a rule would have
the effect of altering the "noneconomic" characterization of a large
portion of tort awards and also might help to mollify some critics
of pain-and-suffering damages.7 '
At least one scholar has advocated this broader notion of fun-
damentally recharacterizing nonpecuniary damages, 7' though,
strangely enough, he did so without making any reference to the
rule of mitigation. 7 2 In addition, when he suggested this idea more
than two decades ago, 173 the treatments available for various forms
170. Indeed, they did just the opposite in calling for little more than internal consis-
tency. See Klein & Hininger, supra note 144, at 428 ("The idea of attaching a numeric value
to psychological injuries is problematic .... but if courts are willing to award damages based
on a problematic formula, they must be willing to reduce those damages using the same
formula."); id. at 439.
171. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 803-05 (1985); id. at 809 ("[D]amages should be limited to the extent that these [in-
tangible] injuries have caused or are anticipated to cause transferable, out-of-pocket
expenses. Such pecuniary damages are likely limited and capable of relatively firm proof.
They, consequently, are less subject to plaintiff fabrication and jury abuse."); id. at 782
("[P]ain and suffering and emotional distress may result in costs that are as quantifiable and
transferable as those that exist in any other injury. Suffering can disable, leading to lost in-
come, the need for medical attention, therapy, or drugs."); id. at 783-84 ("Society has
sufficiently acknowledged the victim's right to bodily and emotional security by granting
damages for the economic ramifications of his injury-his cost of coping and of being reha-
bilitated. The remaining injury is arguably only that which is truly nonquantifiable and
nontransferable and, therefore, best borne by the victim."). Ingber qualified his proposal to
limit nonpecuniary damages in various ways: excluding willful torts, id. at 791, and shifting
attorneys' fees, id. at 812.
172. As a consequence, he failed to address any of the objections lodged against psychi-
atric mitigation, focusing instead on rebutting objections to any proposal that would have
the effect of stringently limiting the magnitude of nonpecuniary awards. Ingber had, how-
ever, hinted at a mitigation requirement in his discussion of intangible damages in
defamation cases. See id. at 835-36 (arguing that, if the defendant refuses to issue a retrac-
tion and the plaintiff fails to secure an opportunity to publish a refutation without cost, the
defendant should finance the plaintiff's effort to issue a reply designed to restore reputa-
tion). Even critics of such an approach seem to be oblivious to the mitigation issue. See
Davies, supra note 24, at 27 n.131 ("While persons suffering from severe emotional distress
may benefit from medical attention, they may not seek it."); id. at 29 ("[G]iven the stigma
still attached to treatment of mental disorders, many individuals may be reluctant to seek
substantial medical treatment.").
173. For still earlier proposals to limit recovery to the pecuniary costs of nonpecuniary
injuries (though also without making any reference to a mitigation requirement and usually
offered only as aspects of more sweeping reforms), see Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "the Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAw. L.
REv. 1, 39-42 (1979); Clarence Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 476,
476-77 (1959);Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants'Pa-ment for Pain and Suffer-
ing in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys'Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 333, 348-53; id. at
349 n.47 ("Thus if psychic loss leads to pecuniary loss-as in the need for psychiatric services
or inability to work because of sheer pain--such loss is payable tinder the above provision as
pecuniary loss."); id. at 368 ("Pain so severe as to cause the tort victim to miss work or pur-
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of pain and suffering remained fairly primitive by today's stan-
dards, which meant that his proposal effectively would have denied
most damages for victims complaining of emotional distress.1 74 (If,
instead, the proposal had invoked the avoidable consequences
doctrine, then, for the same technological reasons, it would have
done little to cabin awards for pain and suffering.) Given fairly
dramatic improvements in the safety and effectiveness of treat-
ments for, among other things, chronic pain and depression, such
a doctrinal recharacterization of these nonpecuniary damages
might enjoy greater traction at this time.175 In other words, with
advances in technology, a rule limiting recovery to the medical ex-
penses associated with mitigating pain and suffering might
chase analgesics does represent economic loss and, as such, will be compensated under the
proposed reforms. Apart from such direct economic loss, damages for pain and suffering
seem to serve no economic function."). In recent years, a couple of commentators have
made passing references to this idea. See Abel, supra note 37, at 323 (tossing it in at the very
end of a lengthy critique of nonpecuniary damages); King, supra note 32, at 168, 173,
205-09 (focusing on expenditures for pain management); id. at 164 (making these rec-
ommendations "tentatively and preliminarily"); see alsoJutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263
F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) ("Various solutions, none wholly satisfactory,
have been suggested, such as ... estimat[ing] how much it would cost the victim (if he
survived) to obtain counseling or therapy to minimize the pain and suffering, Law Commis-
sion, Damages for Personal Injury: Non Pecuniary Loss 8 (Consultation Paper No. 140, 1995);
Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 476-77 (Can. S. Ct.)
.... "); PETER CANE, ATIYAH's AcCIDENTs, COMPENSATION AND THE L.Aw 354 (6th ed. 1999)
("[W]hen all has been done to minimize the pain and suffering by medical means, any re-
sidual pain and suffering cannot be shifted; it remains with the victim, no matter what
compensation is paid to that person by others.").
174. See Ingber, supra note 171, at 783 ("Restricting damages for intangible injuries to
their tangible ramifications clearly leaves part, if not a significant part, of the injury to be
borne by the ... plaintiff alone."). Conversely, with such a damage limitation in place, Ing-
ber would have allowed recovery by a broader class of emotional distress victims. See id. at
817-19; see also Miller, supra note 173, at 39-40. Contrast Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 492,
518-20 (favoring further restrictions on emotional distress claims given the difficulty of
imposing a psychiatric mitigation requirement).
175. See Kolber, supra note 140, at 1594 ("As mental health treatments become more ef-
fective, however, a plaintiff's failure to use them may appear more unreasonable, and courts
may become more willing to penalize plaintiffs who fail to mitigate emotional damages."); cf
Martin V. Totaro, Note, Modernizing the Critique of Per Diem Pain and Suffering Damages, 92 VA.
L. REv. 289, 310-19 (2006) (focusing on cognitive-behavioral treatments for pain, and con-
tending that their availability undermines the assumption of relatively constant and
unremitting agony behind requests for future nonpecuniary damages based on time-unit
arguments); id. at 323 ("[C]ourts permitting the per diem argument have not incorporated
advances in the field of pain and suffering into their analyses."); infra note 194 (drawing a
parallel to the legal impact of advances in antipsychotic medications). In making such a
proposal more than a quarter of a century ago, one scholar noted that "[s ] ince World War II
there have been dramatic innovations in treatment for the relief of pain, not only through
analgesics but through more novel devices, including the application of electric signals to
the nervous system to block the feeling of pain." O'Connell, supra note 173, at 349 n.47. As
explained in Part III.C above, these technological advances have continued apace and ex-
tend beyond simple pain relief to offer promising treatments for other forms of suffering.
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converge at least partially with existing awards for nonpecuniary
damages.7 '
A psychiatric mitigation requirement would, of course, fail to ac-
count for some types of pain and suffering. In the context of
nonpsychiatric mitigation, victims may not recover entirely from
their physical injuries, and the common law allows damages for the
economic consequences of these lasting disabilities in the form of
lost earning capacity. Similarly, in the context of psychiatric mitiga-
tion, victims may not recuperate entirely from their emotional
injuries, and the courts presumably would continue to award dam-
ages for both the economic and noneconomic consequences of
intractable (i.e., untreatable) pain and suffering.
Even so, applying the avoidable consequences doctrine in this
setting may have a number of desirable effects. First, expenditures
for psychiatric mitigation could provide a more precise baseline
from which to calculate total noneconomic damages;7 7 in practice,
when parties settle, economic damages (and medical expenses in
particular) currently serve this purpose.' Indeed, one commenta-
176. Those commentators who recommend eliminating noneconomic damages alto-
gether would force plaintiffs to prove psychiatric expenses as "special" damages; in contrast,
applying the mitigation requirement more rigorously would mean that the burden of proof
remains with the defendant and also would continue to allow recoveries for the unmitigable
portion of pain-and-suffering damages. The intermediate option that I urge would obligate
the plaintiff to provide evidence of mitigation efforts by revising jury instructions to require
some proof of pain and suffering (and explaining that an award for noneconomic damages
seeks to cover only those harms that the plaintiff could not have treated successfully). At a
minimum,juries should differentiate between past and future nonpecuniary damages.
177. Perhapsjuries could select from a sliding scale of multipliers (e.g., 5-25) based on
their assessment of the severity of the untreatable injury. In one of the cases described pre-
viously, the final award reflected a ratio of almost 10:1. See In reAir Crash at Charlotte, 982 F.
Supp. 1101, 1110-11 (D.S.C. 1997) (awarding nearly $31,000 for future psychiatric expenses
and $300,000 for pain and suffering). Although the court did not make any mention of such
a ratio, it did reject the defendant's suggestion to use prior awards (and the relationship
between the awards for physical and emotional injuries) as a guide. See id. at 1112-13 & n.9;
cf Feld v. Merriam, 461 A.2d 225, 229, 234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (affirming an award of
$8,900 for past psychiatric expenses and almost $3 million for pain and suffering), rev'd on
other grounds, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984). Along roughly similar lines, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has suggested some outer limits on the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003) (noting that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and com-
pensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process").
178. See Ingber, supra note 171, at 779 ("[T]o avoid the risk and uncertainty of a jury
verdict, .. . defendants often settle claims for noneconomic loss by offering a fixed multiple
of more easily provable economic loss, for example, medical expenses."); O'Connell, supra
note 173, at 334 ("[Liability] insurers start with a multiple of a claimant's medical bills and
wage loss: every dollar of pecuniary loss is worth, say, three dollars for pain and suffering.");
id. at 342 & n.20 (adding that the multiplier serves only as a handy "starting point"); Neil
Vidinar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A
Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IowA L. REv. 883, 894 (1993) ("Judges and
attorneys in North Carolina frequently speak of an informal guideline that suggests that
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-. 179tor recently proposed that juries use a multiplier, even though
the severity of the physical injury does not invariably correlate to
the severity of the emotional injury.' One could draw a parallel to
the methodological disputes in the willingness-to-pay context, 8'
though particularized in this setting: expenditures for psychiatric
mitigation would offer concrete evidence of victims' revealed pref-
erences as a basis for judging the severity of their reported pain
and suffering,12 which would have obvious advantages over the
noneconomic damages should be between three and seven times the amount of economic
damages."); Wissler et al., supra note 40, at 812-13 n.179 (noting that "the rule of thumb
some lawyers use to come up with a figure for general damages for purposes of settlement
negotiations [is] multiplying medical specials by three"); Peter Passell, The Health Care Plan
Could Worsen Injury-Claim Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at D2 ("[T]he cost of medical
treatment is generally used as a benchmark of injury severity in calculating out-of-court
settlements for 'pain and suffering.' Hence a $4,000 medical bill can be used to leverage ...
another two or three times the $4,000 payment for pain and suffering."); see also Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious Na-
ture of Plaintffs'Practice in Texas, 80 Thx. L. REV. 1781, 1807 n.61 (2002) (reporting that the
multiplier had declined from about 3.1 to 1.7).
179. See Avraham, supra note 53, at 110-19 (proposing "a system of nonbinding age-
adjusted multipliers"); id. at 111 (offering for illustrative purposes a range of multipliers
from 0.5 for medical expenses not exceeding $100,000 up to 1.25 for medical expenses
above $1 million); id. at 110-11 n.116 ("[I]t seems intuitive that people with more severe
injuries (reflected in higher health costs) suffer proportionally more from their injuries.");
see also Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 211 (1958)
(suggesting that noneconomic damages not exceed 50% of medical expenses); cf Jones v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 E2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Once it has been proved by objec-
tive evidence that the [physical] injury will continue adversely to affect the plaintiff, the jury
may not give a take nothing verdict for future pain, suffering, and mental anguish."); id. at
989 (conceding, however, that the plaintiff was "an extremely stoic and cheerful person");
Healy v. Bearco Mgmt., Inc., 576 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Am. States Insur.
Co. v. Audubon Country Club, 650 S.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Ky. 1983) (suggesting that future
pain-and-suffering damages should be awarded whenever there are future medical ex-
penses); Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Validity of Verdict Awarding Medical Expenses to Personal
Injury Plaintiff but Failing to Award Damages for Pain and Suffering, 55 A.L.R.4th 186 (1987 &
Supp. 2007).
180. See supra note 149. Any such correlation would, of course, be entirely absent in
claims for the infliction of emotional distress alone, at least unless that distress triggers some
physical manifestation.
181. See Adler, supra note 64, at 1030-34; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.
182. See O'Connell & Bailey, supra note 124, at 104 (observing that plaintiffs' lawyers
may draw attention to prescriptions for analgesics and other records of treatment for pain).
Along similar lines, in an investigation of whether the prospect for recovering pain and
suffering damages alters the behavior of injury victims, one group of researchers looked at
patterns of pharmaceutical usage rather than rely on subjective reports about pain. See Cor-
neliusJ. Peck et al., The Effect of the Pendency of Claims for Compensation upon Behavior Indicative
of Pain, 53 WASH. L. REV. 251, 260-61 (1978) ("Data concerning the use of prescribed anal-
gesic drugs are presumably the best indicators of pain and pain behavior. There are,
however, many types of analgesic drngs of varying strength, and reduction to common units
for measurement is necessary if comparisons are to be made. Accordingly, narcotic and
barbiturate equivalency tables were prepared for the various types of drugs ...."); id. at
268-70 (finding that workmen's compensation claimants with "third-party [tort] claims
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contingent valuation alternative of asking jurors how much a rea-
sonable person would have been willing to pay to avoid the risk of
the injury experienced by the victim."3
Second, courts would encourage victims to take reasonable steps
to minimize the severity of these consequences. Communicating an
expectation of psychiatric mitigation may have a salutary impact by
counterbalancing the often anti-therapeutic effects of tort litiga-
tion.14 If plaintiffs understood that judges and juries would have
more of an interest in evidence of their rehabilitative efforts than
persistent complaints about their unmitigated agony, then victims
might sooner seek out the help that they (claim that they) need.
8 5
engaged in behavior indicative of pain at a statistically significantly higher rate than the
control group [with respect to] the use of prescribed pain-relieving drugs," but discounting
this result); see also id. at 274 ("Because of its sensitivity as a measure of pain and its impor-
tance in types of pain behavior, the data concerning drug usage deserve comment."). But cf
Jennifer S. Labus et al., Self-Reports of Pain Intensity and Direct Observations of Pain Behavior:
Wen Are They Correlated?, 102 PAIN 109, 119-21 (2003) (cautioning against undue reliance
on non-verbal cues, though focusing on pain behaviors other than taking medication);
Dennis C. Turk & Herta Flor, Pain > Pain Behaviors: The Utility and Limitations of the Pain Be-
havior Construct, 31 PAIN 277 (1987) (same).
183. In a study designed to evaluate the variability of monetary awards for general dam-
ages, a group of researchers used a survey instrument that evidently failed to include any
references to psychiatric interventions. See Wissler et al., supra note 40, at 819 (providing
examples of injury descriptions used in their survey); see also id. at 764 ("We did not include
cases in which ... the plaintiff suffered only emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury."). As a more flexible option than a proposed scheduling approach, one group of
authors suggested that judges could give juries a series of valuation scenarios, which would
include references to additional factors reflective of pain and loss of functioning. See Bovb-
jerg et al., supra note 51, at 954 (suggesting that "one might use fairly simple descriptors,
such as the strength of drug needed to control pain"); id. at 955 (illustrating with a scenario
that included the following information: "Her arm throbs painfully most of the time, but the
pain can usually be controlled with aspirin."); see also McCaffery et al., supra note 53, at
1380-81 (discussing a survey question that had asked about approaches to measuring dam-
ages for pain and suffering, and noting that some of the answers "talked of simple heuristics,
such as referring to the cost of anesthesia as an estimate of the 'price' of pain").
184. For instance, PTSD sufferers may find themselves retraumatized by the litigation
process. See Hickling et al., supra note 28, at 630-31; see alsoJ. David Cassidy et al., Effect of
Eliminating Compensation for Pain and Suffering on the Outcome of Insurance Claims for Whiplash
Injury, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1179, 1184-85 (2000) (finding lower reported levels of pain
and depression when traffic accident victims could no longer seek to recover noneconomic
damages); Richard Mayou et al., Prediction of Psychological Outcomes One Year After a Motor Vehi-
cle Accident, 158 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 1231, 1237 (2001) ("Litigation is a continuing reminder
of the accident that may interfere with a natural tendency toward symptom resolution."); cf
Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 149, at 785-87 (making a similar argument against award-
ing hedonic damages); id. at 787 ("Damages that compensate for the out-of-pocket costs of
rehabilitation ... would not cause these disempowering effects; they are in fact means of
empowerment.").
185. See Ingber, supra note 171, at 808 ("A system that awards damages for the pecuniary
losses associated with intangible injuries-but refuses general damages-would demonstrate
societal concern for the victim's plight while emphasizing rehabilitative needs rather than
suffering. Thus, the system's focus would be positive-on healing-rather than negative--on
disability."); id. at 782 ("[W]hen dealing with those affected by emotional distress, such
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The danger, of course, is that plaintiffs then might incur charges
for psychiatric interventions more easily than they would run up
other types of medical expenses.1
8 6
Third, focusing on treatable pain and suffering as a medical ex-
pense may promote clarity in thinking about the nature and
purpose of what remains in the category of noneconomic damages:
acute (past) pain and suffering, which the victim would have experi-
enced before having any opportunity to seek out medical
intervention; "" pain and suffering that fail to respond to reason-
able treatment efforts;ss and the loss of enjoyment of life, which
some courts have characterized as the noneconomic aspects of
the permanent disability suffered by the victim. "9 It also might
help to focus the debate over such hedonic damages,' 90 drawing
damages may encourage sufferers to seek professional assistance and rehabilitation. Without
such encouragement, these individuals might not pursue therapy due to feelings of shame
or fear of stigma from acknowledging 'emotional instability.'" (footnote omitted)); Pryor,
supra note 20, at 681-82; cf Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 375-76 (1984); id. at 396 (arguing that emotional distress
"damages may enable and encourage plaintiffs to obtain professional psychological assis-
tance soon after the onset of the traumatic injury").
186. See Kontorovich, supra note 143, at 510-11; cf supra notes 157-58 and accompany-
ing text (summarizing and responding to these concerns). Similarly, commentators suspect
that plaintiffs might incur unnecessary diagnostic expenses even if they would not undergo
more dangerous therapeutic interventions. See Avraham, supra note 53, at 115 ("While a
plaintiff may strategically go to excessive doctor's visits or get unnecessary X-rays, she will not
volunteer to go through an operation merely to receive higher pain-and-suffering compen-
sation down the road."). Limitations on insurance coverage for mental health care, see supra
note 22, may help to counteract this tendency, and estimates of future psychiatric expenses
would, of course, depend on expert testimony rather than a pattern of prior utilization.
187. See, e.g., Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1992);
Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd., 718 A.2d 1161, 1169-79, 1183-85 (Md. 1998);
Oliveira v. Jacobson, 846 A.2d 822, 827-28 (R.I. 2004); see also Leebron, supra note 38, at
260-70, 279-88.
188. See, e.g., Helleckson v. Loiselle, 155 N.W.2d 45, 49-50 (Wis. 1967) (explaining that,
in calculating pain-and-suffering damages, the jury should consider the extent to which the
patient experienced only incomplete relief from narcotic painkillers and tranquilizers that
he had received in the hospital).
189. See, e.g., LeBleu v. Safeway Ins. Co., 824 So. 2d 422, 426 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (ex-
plaining that "an award for disability may include compensation for limitations on activities
outside the workplace," and rejecting the defendant's objection that this conflicted with the
failure to award future pain and suffering damages); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson,
116 S.W.3d 757, 763-72 (Tex. 2003) (discussing damages for "physical impairment"); see also
Pryor, supra note 11, at 151-52; id. at 121 n.102 (suggesting a "rehabilitated self" standard
that "might articulate those functions, abilities, and activities that are deemed basic to a
meaningful quality of life and then resolve issues of compensability in light of these judg-
ments"); id. at 129-31 (arguing that it makes more sense to look at "component aspects of
the loss, rather than to the loss as a whole," because otherwise one "would count as nonpe-
cuniary even those losses that could be largely corrected by basic medical care," but also
cautioning against the potential expansiveness of such a particularized approach).
190. See, e.g., McGee v. AC&S, Inc., 933 So. 2d 770, 774-80 & n.3 (La. 2006) (noting
conflict among jurisdictions); id. at 780-84 & n.2 (Victory, J., dissenting) (same); Smallwood
v. Bradford, 720 A.2d 586, 592-95 (Md. 1998); Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 61-64
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closer attention to this feature of the award without the need to
carve it out as a freestanding category of nonpecuniary damages
and the accompanying risk of duplicative recovery. For instance,
once the victim has made all reasonable efforts to manage the dis-
tress caused by the defendant, the parties could use experts to help
thejury engage in a QALY-based analysis.
Finally, though this proposal seeks to improve the consistency of
awards for pain and suffering as well as to limit their magnitude,
plaintiffs need not necessarily fear such a change. As legislatures
increasingly constrain noneconomic damages,1' shifting some
nonpecuniary harms into the category of economic damages as
medical expenses can only serve to maximize the payout received
in a case where, for instance, a cap or ratio otherwise would reduce
the award. 192 Of course, nothing currently prevents plaintiffs from
(Nev. 2004); see also Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 149, at 748-49, 755-59, 774-97;
Feldman, supra note 33, at 1591-94; King, supra note 32, at 205 ("I disagree with those who
have suggested that damages include a sum for purchasing surrogate pleasures or to pay for
new activities, all to serve as substitutes for the former pleasures and satisfactions that the
post-accident condition and limitations have now placed out of reach."); Susan Poser et al.,
MeasuringDamages for Lost Enjoyment of Life: The View from the Bench and the Jury Box, 27 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 53 (2003); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly
Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1037 (2004). Hedonic damages may, however, refer
more narrowly only to the nonpecuniary value of life in the case of a fatal injury, which also
presents the issue in stark terms insofar as the victim would have had no occasion for recov-
ering future pain-and-suffering damages. See Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242, 245-48
(Ark. 2004); AndrewJay McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrong-
JulDeath Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60-61 n.9 (1990).
191. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 2007) (limiting, subject to various
exceptions, noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to the greater of $250,000
or three times economic damages up to a maximum of $350,000); Preston v. Dupont, 35
P.3d 433, 440-42 (Colo. 2001) (holding that a statutory cap on noneconomic damages did
not limit recoveries for "physical impairment or disfigurement"); Barlow v. N. Okaloosa
Med. Ctr., 877 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that the $500,000 cap applicable to
medical malpractice cases sought to address the size and unpredictably of noneconomic
damage awards); see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform" Move-
ment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 437, 490-91 & n.257, 496-99 (2006).
192. In worker's compensation, claimants already do something comparable. This non-
tort remedy for occupational injuries increasingly recognizes mental distress claims but
continues to award only pecuniary damages. See Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and
Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 879, 896-912
(1987); Emmanuel S. Tipon, Annotation, Right to Workers' Compensation for Emotional Distress
or Like Injury Suffered By Claimant as Result of Nonsudden Stimuli-Compensability Under Particu-
lar Circumstances, 108 A.L.R.5th 1 (2003 & Supp. 2007). Claimants may recover expenses
associated with drug treatment and psychiatric counseling. See, e.g., Zebco Motorguide v.
Briggs, 881 P.2d 103, 104 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); Wade v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 735 S.W.2d
215, 220 (Tenn. 1987); Roller v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 117 P.3d 385, 388-89 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2005); see also 5 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 94.03[3] [b] (2007) ("Psychiatric medical benefits are now routinely awarded in appropri-
ate cases."). Mental distress claimants also may seek lost wages for their alleged disability. See,
e.g., Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 314, 320-24 (Tenn. 2005); see also Pryor,
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making such a tactical choice.1 9 In smaller cases where a damages
cap would not come into play, however, the movement of erstwhile
nonpecuniary harms into economic damages may well result in a
smaller payout on the assumption that expenditures for psychiatric
mitigation will increase the amount for medical expenses by far
less than the decrease achieved in the award for pain and suffering.
As with additional medical expenses that serve to reduce the de-
gree of lost earning capacity, application of the avoidable
consequences doctrine will reduce the size of awards where justi-
fied by principles of joint cost-minimization. In the context of
psychiatric mitigation, the doctrine may have the additional bene-
fit of helping to structure and constrain the assessment of the
residual lost (non-earning) capacity to enjoy life.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pain and suffering long ago became synonymous with
noneconomic damages, and recoveries for emotional distress
claims quite naturally followed that approach. Courts may need to
revisit their choice of characterization. Just as it would make no
sense to equate physical injuries solely with economic damages, it
makes no sense to treat emotional harms as invariably
noneconomic, at least not nowadays. Physical and mental injuries
have both pecuniary and nonpecuniary consequences, but
doctrine continues to reflect long-discredited notions about the
supra note 144, at 241 (explaining that these programs "do not compensate for pain inde-
pendently; rather, they largely compensate lost-earning capacity").
193. See Avraham, supra note 53, at 100 ("[P] laintiff lawyers may 'itemize' noneconomic
damages by looking for economic justification for them, in order to move those 'itemized'
damages into the noncapped economic losses."); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 NY.U. L. REV. 391, 429-44, 493-95
(2005) (describing "crossover effects," though not using proof of expenditures for psychiat-
ric mitigation as an example); cf Musa v. Jefferson County Bank, 620 N.W.2d 797, 800-02,
804-05 (Wis. 2001) (declining to extend a limitation applicable to the recovery of emotional
distress damages for intentional interference with contractual relationships to an award for
mental health treatment expenses in such a case); id. at 806 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing this characterization); Adam Uptak, Pain-and-Suffering Awards LetJuries Avoid New Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A14 ("As all sorts of limitations have recently been placed on
punitive damages, creative lawyers have shifted their attention to pain and suffering, a little-
scrutinized form of compensation for psychic harm."). Even without caps, differential tax
treatment, see supra note 13, might make plaintiffs (though perhaps not their attorneys)
better off if they could characterize part of their pain-and-suffering damage awards as medi-
cal expenses. In any event, juries already might engage in such recharacterization. See Green
v. Franklin, 235 Cal. Rptr. 312, 322-23 (Ct. App. 1987) (observing that an instruction on a
cap "would only serve to increase the possibility that a jury may simply label damages that
otherwise would have been denominated noneconomic as economic losses"); Noah, supra
note 44, at 1616-18.
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nature of emotional harms. In addition, judicial hostility to
psychiatric mitigation emerged at a time when available treatment
options were decidedly primitive. As interventions have become
safer and more effective, and as the social stigma associated with
their use has largely dissipated, courts should revisit the issue.1 94
Applying the doctrine of avoidable consequences in cases of
emotional injury should result in a recharacterization of some
pain-and-suffering damages as medical expenses, whether or not
the plaintiff chooses to make such use of an award in the future,
and it might help to confine what remains under the banner of
noneconomic damages.
194. Along similar lines, judges have shown a growing willingness to order treatment of
schizophrenic patients. See Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal
Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1033, 1128-29 (2002); id. at 1156 ("The last decade's advances in psychopharmacology
require courts and legal scholars to re-evaluate the role and value of antipsychotic drugs
without being misled by distorted and increasingly outdated views found in existing case law
and secondary legal sources.").
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